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Abstract
This research focuses on the design of a procurement model for expensive medical supplies
in a healthcare supply chain. A deterministic optimization model generates
recommendations for optimal purchases of products in a given planning period. The model
combines common concepts of supply chain procurement such as leveraging tiered pricing,
ensuring supply base diversity with phenomena unique to healthcare supply chain such as
consideration of physician preference for products. The deterministic optimization model
minimizes total spend over a chosen planning period with consideration of four key
decision parameters:
•

Physician preference requirements (which are imposed as rules on product
substitutability),

•

Upper limits on vendor market share to ensure a suitably diverse supply base

•

Vendors’ performance scores to impose standards for product pricing, quality,
service, etc.

•

Quantity discount rebate parameters for bulk purchasing to help contain medical
costs

The optimization model reveals the extent to which higher product substitutability and
lower supply base diversity may help hospitals reduce total procurement costs.
Experiments with the optimization model also reveal the potential consequences of rater
biases in vendor scorecards on procurement cost. The various parameter combinations
listed above may be used in negotiating contracts for better pricing.
In summary, this research addresses questions pertinent to healthcare supply chains
concerning the possible cost of physician preference for products, the impact of subjective
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scorecards on procurement costs, the effect of planning period on procurement plans, and
the cost of vendor diversity.

6

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
1

Introduction
Cost management is an area of concern for healthcare providers in a sector of the USA

economy, which as of early 2018, exceeds 18% of GDP (Papinicolas et al., 2018). A 2018
survey of 140 healthcare providers and suppliers revealed that cost management
specifically through supply chain savings was the top trending issue of concern in
healthcare supply chain management (Schiller, 2018). In the USA, costs connected with
expensive medical device waste alone, have been estimated to be $5 billion annually
(DiChiaria, 2016).

Given that medical supplies are the second largest expense for

healthcare organizations (surpassed only by labor expense), it is easy to see why supply
cost management is challenging (Belliveau, J., 2017).
Medical supplies can be classified into two categories - Physician Preference Items
(PPIs) such as implants, defibrillators, pacemakers etc. and commodity items such as
bandages, syringes etc. Commodity-item purchases are usually handled by procurement
teams without involvement of physicians. PPIs however follow a different purchasing path.
In fact, the supply chain for PPIs begins with the physicians themselves since they tend to
select the products and then advise procurement personnel which products should be
purchased (Finn, T., 2015). The resulting PPI purchases can occur without pre-negotiated
contracts, resulting in variations in purchasing price, fewer savings opportunities, and
higher healthcare costs (Belliveau, J., 2017). Physicians’ preference expressed as an
unwillingness to consider using an equally effective alternative device can be considered
an element of a supply chain risk given that it reduces flexibility and speed of supply chain
responses to product backorders, recalls, and long-term disruptions in the supply chain.
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Regardless of type of product being purchased, procurement channels in healthcare
are changing. Historically, hospitals participated in group purchasing organizations
(GPOs) to leverage aggregate purchasing volumes. This helped them achieve quantity
discounts with medical device manufacturers. Recently, however some healthcare systems
are noticing that withdrawing from GPOs enables them to avoid administrative fees and
negotiate contracts directly with manufacturers more efficiently. Reciprocally, medical
device manufacturers think the GPOs are doing a lackluster job of conveying the
uniqueness of their products to hospitals, leading them to prefer direct engagement with
the hospitals (Kacik, 2018). There is also a certain degree of mistrust towards GPOs
resulting from anti-trust and anti-kickback lawsuits from the early 2000s. (Weinstein, B.L.,
2006). These changes in perception of GPOs have created an inconsistent relationship
between hospitals and GPOs, making contract negotiations a more localized hospital-level
effort (McKone et al., 2016). Healthcare organizations have recognized that supply-chain
management personnel can help in replacing GPO functions and effectively negotiate
contracts for PPIs and commodity items.
To operationalize the chosen procurement strategy – specifically one where contracts
are designed without GPO leverage – an organization has to first determine a pool of
qualifying vendors. Scorecards are a common tool used to assess vendor performance and
select this pool of vendors. Variants of balanced scorecards first proposed by Kaplan and
Norton (1992) can be used for vendor evaluation and selection (Galankashi et al., 2016).
The balanced scorecard proposes the use of joint financial and operational measures for
performance measurement. Organizations use these joint measures to seek a mix of
desirable characteristics such as cost competitiveness, reliable customer service etc. in their
8

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
vendor pool. Performance is evaluated by teams of internal members who routinely deal
with the vendor’s representatives or the vendor’s processes through interactions such as
contract negotiations, purchase order activities, billing, and inventory management. For
such evaluations organizations often use various objective and subjective ratings. A
healthcare organization, for example, may value a vendor who provides access to
innovative medical technology through their product offerings, more than one who offers
the cheapest product. However if cost reduction is a critical goal for a hospital, they may
seek opportunities to “cherry-pick” vendors that offer the cheapest product in a category,
as long as the products meet quality specifications while trying to ensure that minimal
vendor performance standards are achieved on all dimensions. It should be noted that the
introduction of scorecards in the procurement process changes behavior on both sides of
the table given their potential effect on market shares and diversification strategies. This
makes scorecards an important consideration in strategic sourcing. Subjective scorecards
can however be sensitive to the biases of the raters creating them. In extreme cases, price
competitive vendors may not be selected due to the whims of raters who cannot fairly judge
vendor capabilities. Losing these vendors can increase procurement costs. A study of the
effects of possible rater biases, is thus in order, when creating an optimization model that
includes subjective scorecards as a primary consideration in its design.
For procurement to be a truly strategic function in healthcare, it should address all
the aforementioned considerations, namely physician preference, cost control, nuances of
vendor performance measurement, and supply base diversification. Procurement teams
often face dilemmas about sourcing products given that accommodating diversification and
physician preference requirements may actually lead to higher procurements costs. It is
9
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easy to see why healthcare organizations are phasing out conventional reactive planning in
favor of proactive planning to address these supply chain issues and risks (Kırılmaz & Erol,
2017). Needed for such planning are analytical tools that can help healthcare organizations
explore alternative strategies and demonstrate the costs of various procurement constraints.
The optimization model presented in this research is one such analytical tool.
1.1

Research Questions
The objective of this dissertation is to provide guidance for procurement processes

and effective contract negotiations by using mathematical modeling. This is achieved
through creating a mixed integer linear programming model for identifying a procurement
strategy that takes advantage of bulk-buy discounts while ensuring a sufficiently diversified
supply to mitigate risk of outages for critical items from appropriate vendors.
Q1: What is the expected cost of adhering strictly to physicians’ preferences on product?
It is axiomatic that with similar patient outcomes, eliminating or reducing reliance
on physician preference could lead to lower supply-chain cost. However, the
impact/magnitude of such changes has not been studied in academia. This dissertation
examines the tradeoffs between physician preference and supply chain cost for critical
items in a healthcare supply chain.

Q2: What is the expected cost of forcing diversification among vendors as a risk mitigation
strategy?
Employing vendor diversification as a risk-mitigation strategy may force an
organization to purchase product from vendors that do not offer the lowest price. The extra
10
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costs may depend on the organization’s tolerance for risk of stockouts. Yang et al (2012)
contend that diversification in suppliers usually comes at a high price due to loss of pricing
concessions. A study conducted by Burke (2007) concluded that single sourcing was an
effective strategy only when supplier capacities were large relative to the product demand
and when the firm did not obtain diversification benefits. This dissertation researches these
tradeoffs in a study of selected critical items in a case study of a healthcare supply chain.

Q3: What is the effect of subjective scorecards on procurement processes?
Balanced scorecards are popular tools used to assess vendor performance but they
are often subjective and may reflect the rater’s biases towards the vendors. The effect of
scorecards on cost savings and market share have not been studied in healthcare
procurement processes. If subjective scorecards become explicit factors to be considered
in procurement decisions, we need to be aware of their possible consequences. This
dissertation addresses this gap in academic research through experiments with different
structures of common-methods variance among scorecard ratings and assesses their impact
on procurement costs.

Q4: How would procurement strategies and purchasing costs change if contracts were
negotiated on an annual basis instead of a quarterly basis?
Bulk purchases can be negotiated at differing fixed planning intervals such as
annually or quarterly. Depending on the historic demand data available, an annual plan can
be created for one annual purchase or quarterly demand data can be used to create four
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quarterly suggested purchases a year. The MILP model is used to test if optimization
models are sensitive to the two different demand aggregation levels.

1.2

Research methodology

To investigate the research questions, a literature review was first conducted to seek
relevant topics in academic research related to the application of deterministic optimization
models in strategic sourcing and mathematical modeling of healthcare supply chain issues.
Reputable non-academic publications were reviewed to identify major trends and issues in
healthcare supply chain to ensure the relevance of the work presented here. Feedback from
the healthcare organization used as the study setting was also used to establish relevance.
The literature review helped identify gaps in research in this field and confirmed that the
research presented here is rigorous in its methodology, addressed knowledge voids, and is
relevant to practice.
Next, data collection exercises were conducted for the product information. Also,
sample scorecards were completed by supply chain managers to allow us to study the rating
process and have sample scorecard data for the rater bias simulation.
From an analytical methodology standpoint, a mixed integer linear programming
model was employed to create the procurement planning tool in SAS 9.4. Parameters for
physician preference, rebate percentage, bulk buy level percentage, maximum vendor
market share, and minimum scorecard requirements were stipulated in the model. In this
dissertation, we first discuss the formulation of the optimization model, followed by testing
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of the model parameters to ensure appropriate model behavior under various parameter
combinations.
When this study was conducted, the healthcare organization was in the process of
finalizing vendor scorecards to be used necessitating the use of hypothetical scorecard data
in this study. To ensure the scorecards were accurately reflective of an actual scorecard
that might be used, we generated the hypothetical scorecards by using a mathematical
model. Nuances of the scoring procedure were captured through observations of score
assignment by the supply chain managers who completed the sample scorecards. Using
these observations, we simulated the sequence with which scores would be assigned and
we emulated the scoring procedure with a mathematical model designed to generate scores
with hypothesized correlation structures and tendencies of raters to give high or low scores.
The various scorecards structures emerging from these simulations were used in our
experiments to answer the relevant research questions. Finally, experiments are conducted
to test the effects of scorecard ratings and planning period on the optimization model.

1.3

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review of
literature related to the evolution of supplier selection models and healthcare sourcing, and
identifies the research gaps which motivate the purposes of this research. . Chapters 3 & 4
present the analytical framework and design and discussion of the deterministic MILP
optimization model. Chapter 5 discusses the various experiments done using the model.
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Chapter 6 summarizes the research findings, provides managerial insights, discusses the
limitations of the research, and identifies areas for fruitful future extensions to this research.

14

2

Literature Review

2

Singh et al. (2017) define strategic sourcing as the process of evaluating, selecting, and
aligning with vendors/suppliers to achieve operational improvements to achieve an
organization’s strategic objectives. Strategic sourcing has been known to improve the
resiliency of a supply chain against various disruptions, especially when procuring critical
products (Arani et al., 2016). As early as 1980, leading procurement organizations had
begun exploring sourcing strategies such as corporate buying, supply base optimization,
total supply chain cost minimization, and goods and services value maximization
(Anderson and Katz, 1998). This initial research combined with interest in leveraging
operations research methodologies for procurement, led to the advancement of
mathematical optimization for strategic sourcing in manufacturing and retail business
settings. The use of these optimization models in the service industry however have
received attention only recently. In healthcare specifically, operations research
methodologies have been used to address issues such as demand forecasting, location
decisions, emergency vehicle routing, capacity planning, procurement decisions,
scheduling decisions, patient and clinician scheduling, resource allocation (including drug
allocation and personnel allocation), and supply chain co-ordination (Rais and Viana,
2011). Of these areas, procurement processes still rely heavily on reactive planning
strategies, instead of proactive planning strategies. Given the large number of hospitals that
outsource purchasing activities (especially for commodity goods), there is a lack of
research examining the use of strategic sourcing to establish cost efficient, sustainable
procurement in healthcare (Knight et al., 2017). The research presented here recognizes
this gap and proposes the use of deterministic optimization, for design of a sourcing
15
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strategy for healthcare. The reference literature used in this dissertation, to identify research
gaps, can be found in publications that discuss studies related to supply chain management,
supply chain risk management, healthcare management, and more specifically healthcare
procurement practices.
Quantitative models for strategic sourcing generally address (1) from whom
(vendors/suppliers) particular products should be bought, (2) from whom products should
be bought and in what quantities (i.e. market share allocation), and (3) the aforementioned
decisions with consideration of the subsequent risk, after sales service, etc. A fourth
research theme is the inquiry of the aforementioned procurement decisions in service
supply chains instead of manufacturing supply chains. Table 1 summarizes the most
relevant prior research by these prevailing themes.
Table 1: Summary of most relevant prior research
Single and multi-attribute supplier selection
Choudhary and Shankar
Lee and Chien (2014)

(2014)

Kamali et al. (2011)

Talluri and Narasimhan
Talluri et al. (2008)

(2003)

Bui et al. (2001)

Supplier selection and market share allocation
Rothkopf & Whinston
Kannan et al. (2013)

Chai et al. (2012)

(2009)

Sandholm (2007)

Burke et al. (2007)

(Metty, 2005)

Parlar and Wang (1993)

Pan (1989)
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Addressing risk management in strategic sourcing
Rao et al. (2017)

DuHadway et al. (2017)

Mavi et al. (2016)

Sawik (2014)

Bunker et al. (2016)

Gandhi et al. (2012)

Braunscheidel and Suresh
Paul (2015)

(2009)

Babich et al. (2007)

Burke et al. (2007)

Tomlin (2006)

Ding et al (2005)

Giunipero and Eltantawy
Finch (2004)

(2004)

Kumar et al. (2003)

Procurement decisions in service industry supply chains
Kros et al. (2018)

Knight et al. (2017)

Karsak and Dursun (2015)

Wang et al. (2015)

Ravindran et al (2010)

Jacobsen et al. (1999)

A review of literature in the area of quantitative models for procurement indicates
that such models generally range from cost based approaches (focused on minimizing and
competing on cost) to multi attribute formulations that explore attributes beyond pricing
competitiveness. In general, most supplier selection and supplier evaluation models use
either an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach, which rates suppliers depending
on their characteristics such as delivery, quality, pricing etc. or a total cost of ownership
approach (Paul, 2015, and Bhutta & Huq, 2002). Along with literature on supplier
selection, two academic publications, Ho et al. (2010) and Fahimnia et al. (2015) are
reviewed to trace the evolution of research on quantitative risk management models that
may be employed when selecting vendors and negotiating contracts. Both these

17

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
publications are recent literature reviews that summarized well-cited works in this area of
research.
Ho et al. (2010) reviewed 78 journal articles from 2000 – 2008 with the intent to
discover which approaches were most prevalent in studying multi-criteria supplier
evaluation/selection, which evaluation criteria were most common and if there was an
inadequacy in the approaches/criteria. In response to the first question (i.e. most prevalent
approaches), the authors discovered that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and
mathematical programming (integer linear/non-linear and goal programming) were the
most common approaches to determine the optimal number of suppliers and optimal order
quantities. These approaches used both quantitative and qualitative measures as evaluation
criteria. The most common among these (in line with the authors’ second investigative
question) were quality, delivery, price/cost, manufacturing capability and service. The
authors concluded from DEA that price (a traditional single criterion) is neither sufficient
nor robust enough alone to evaluate suppliers. DEA was judged to be a confusing approach
for practitioners since real business objectives were not used as the evaluation criteria.
Fahimnia et al. (2015) conducted an analysis of quantitative models (mathematical,
optimization and simulation) employed for supply chain risk management (SCRM) in a
review of 1108 journal articles (initial search resulted in 2304 publications, which was
reduced to a final sample of 1104 relevant papers) published between 1978- 2013. The
bibliometric analysis conducted using BibExcel consisted of a wide search of terms
referring to supply chain risk. The authors discovered that there is a lack of uniform
definitions and terminology in SCRM; hence they searched literature over a wider time
period and range of journals compared to Ho et al (2010). Top contributing journals were
18
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International Journal of Production Research and International Journal of Production
Economics. Of the eight key research clusters/topics identified, six topic clusters were
about supply uncertainty, demand uncertainty, uncertainty modeling in operational
planning, uncertainty modeling in facility location, uncertainty modeling in inventory
management and uncertainty in purchasing and retail sourcing. From a review of the top
contributing journals noted the authors noted that most research is concentrated in
manufacturing and industrial settings, leaving a SCRM research gap for service industries.
Ho et al. (2010) and Fahiminia et al. (2015) both highlight the opportunity to study supply
chain risk management especially for procurement in service industries like healthcare.
A more in-depth look into the papers cited in articles by the Ho et al (2010) and
Fahiminia et al (2015) highlights the foundational set of papers for this dissertation.
2.1

Early work on single and multi-attribute supplier selection
A summary of research on supplier selection models was provided by Kannan et

al. (2013) as shown in Figure 1. Their review extended the work presented by Chai et al.
(2012) regarding decision making techniques for supplier selection. Through a review of
123 journal articles published from 2008 to 2012, the most frequently used technique for
supplier selection was found to be Analytical Hierarchical process (AHP), followed by
linear programming (LP) and Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal
Solution (TOPSIS).
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Figure 1: Summary of supplier selection methods (Source: Kannan et al., 2013)
The initial work in the area of quantitative models for supplier selection mainly
focused on price as a selection criterion and generally tried to minimize cost without
consideration of the risk management. There was some discussion of tradeoffs between
diversification and favorable pricing, but articles focused mainly on total cost as the only
criterion in supplier selection. Bui et al. (2001) contend that negotiations should optimize
both buyer and supplier interests by addressing quantitative and qualitative attributes such
as product quality, speed, reputation, after sales service, etc. Research on quantitative
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models for market share allocation and contract negotiation indicates that such models
generally range from cost based approaches (focused on minimizing and competing on
cost) to multi attribute models that explore supplier qualities beyond pricing
competitiveness. A supplier that provides the best price, for example, may not provide the
necessary flexibility in volume and delivery time in case of an adverse event. Poor
historical performance regarding timeliness and quality signal risks of disruption. Further,
the attributes that make a vendor attractive in a portfolio (e.g., to diversify risk) may differ
from the prime attributes that qualified the vendor to be on the supplier list (Lee and Chien,
2014).
Lee and Chien (2014) highlighted four general issues with vendor/ supplier
selection problem. Firstly, the objectives that are considered in evaluating vendor portfolios
(e.g. risk diversification) usually differ from the objectives considered in selecting an
individual vendor. Secondly, Lee and Chien (2014) claim that vendors selected in a
portfolio are usually interrelated and their interrelation is generally not modeled. Thirdly,
it is difficult to clarify the correlation among vendor selection criteria and performance
measures (e.g. quality can be both a selection criteria and performance measure) and
according to Lee and Chien (2014) this makes the mathematical modeling of vendor
selection difficult. Lastly, in general vendor selection problems tend to be large scale
problems if an extensive list of selection goals is used. From observations in practice,
vendors in a selected portfolio may be competitors but are rarely interrelated. Further,
market shares are allocated assuming vendor independence. Hence, this dissertation does
not model vendor interrelation.
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Other academicians have also voiced the need for multi-attribute models which
look beyond pricing flexibility. Talluri and Narasimhan (2003) proposed to minimize
variability in supplier performance instead of minimizing total cost.

Two linear

programming models were developed to maximize productivity, which was defined to
include quality and delivery in addition to price. In an extension of their work, Talluri et
al. (2008) performed data envelopment analysis (DEA) to rate the efficiency of suppliers
(efficiency defined as better output for least input) were chosen. The model was novel in
its approach of offering distinctive negotiations with efficient versus inefficient suppliers.
They recommended that a larger set of attributes be considered for such models. In this
dissertation, the set of attributes is extended to include innovation and operational
excellence, which represent the vendor’s ability to provide the hospitals with information
regarding new product pipeline and opportunities to improve supply chain operations.
Quantity discounts are the biggest drivers of contract negotiations, and suppliers
offering such deals are more favored than their peers. Amongst the works that account for
quantity discounts in the supplier selection models, the Kamali et al. (2011) study is notable
in that it incorporated quantity discount policies in tandem with joint cost reduction while
developing their model for supplier selection. The proposed non-linear multi-objective
mixed integer programming model minimized the total system cost which included both
the buyer and the supplier’s annual cost. To extend the supplier selection criteria beyond
pricing, the authors also considered total purchasing (production) value, total late
deliveries, and total defective items. The objective function was set up as a goal
programming problem for multiple objectives where the deviation from all goals was
minimized. Weights were assigned to each supplier selection criteria related to quality and
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delivery. The authors found that the objective function was highly sensitive to the changes
in demand, production rates, variable costs, defective rates, and late delivery rates.
Further review of more recent literature provides examples of studies that use
pricing as a main criterion for supplier selection but may also incorporate other quality
related goals. An example of such a study is the goal programming modeling conducted by
Choudhary and Shankar (2014) in a manufacturing setting for joint decision making of
inventory lot sizing (i.e. order allocation), supplier selection and carrier selection which
incorporated an additional factor of transportation costs. Three variations of goal
programming (pre-emptive, non-preemptive and weighted max-min fuzzy logic) were used
to design a model that minimized three goals; net rejected items, net delayed deliveries,
and purchasing, inventory and transportation costs. In this study suppliers were not ranked
by their attributes of delivery and quality metrics. These attributes were however used as
goals in addition to the primary purchasing goal. The authors presented trade-offs between
service level requirements and total costs incurred and found that higher service levels
resulted in higher total costs. They found that the pre-emptive and weighted max-min fuzzy
models were more sensitive to the weights assigned to the goals than the non-preemptive
model.
2.2

Supplier selection and market share allocation
Going beyond just optimal supplier selection, there are studies which focused on

both supplier selection and market share allocation decisions. To leverage quantity
discounts offered by vendors, careful decisions have to be made regarding the market share
allocated to each vendor. Vendor market shares are finalized via contract negotiations on
either a quarterly or annual basis and they determine the various usage tiers that qualify an
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organization for quantity discounts. Studies that recognize the importance of dynamic
market share allocation provide a more wholesome look at procurement decisions. Most
interesting research in this area, is the work conducted by Motorola Inc. to improve their
supplier contract negotiation using a MIP model wherein they optimized contract awards
across sectors with various suppliers (Metty, 2005). To optimize their e-auctions the model
minimized a function of price associated with a bid and quantity. Variables representing
non-price attributes that affect pricing such that supplier quality and reputation were
introduced using constraints. As an example, the tool optimized an auction with over 200
items, over 700 bids, and over a hundred constraints and allocated the contract award to
each winning supplier for each item category. Electronic auctions have been the latest
development in strategic sourcing, replacing negotiations and decreasing transactions
costs. Though they have offered the buyers leverage by providing web based analytical
technology, e-auctions have sometimes faced resistance from suppliers as they have
replaced face-to-face negotiations and interactions. (Rothkopf & Whinston, 2009). Within
e-auctions, a subset of research focuses on combinatorial auctions for procuring items from
multiple suppliers (Sandholm, 2007). These allow the bidders and buyers to express
constraints about complementarity and substitutability among items in a bid. Optimization
methods in this research area minimize cost of bids while constraining the size of the bids.
Constraints for discounts and supplier diversity were added to these optimizations as well.
Procurement methods that apply web based technology generally allow the user to create
constraints instead of embedding them in the optimization model. There is a large body of
work about e-auctions and the modeling involved; it is however outside the scope of
relevant discussion here.
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Kannan et al. (2013) designed a fuzzy multi attribute, multi-objective model for
rating and selecting suppliers according to economic and environmental criteria, and then
allocating the optimum market share to each supplier. The two objectives of the model
were to simultaneously maximize the total purchasing value and minimize the total cost of
purchasing. Using an Iranian auto manufacturer as a study setting, a fuzzy AHP was used
to calculate the relative weights for three suppliers for the following selection criteria Cost, quality, delivery, technological capability, and environmental competency. Using
survey methodology, the criteria were ranked and a fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix of
the criteria was built. Next, using fuzzy Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity
to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), suppliers were ranked using the weighted criteria. Finally, the
weights of the criteria and ranks of suppliers were incorporated into a multi-objective linear
programming model to determine the optimal order quantity from each supplier while
being subjected to resource constraints. Costs considered in the study were unit holding
cost, unit price, order/setup cost, and unit transportation cost. The model’s sensitivity was
analyzed by varying weights for the two objectives. Further, changing the weights of the
criteria helped reflect the organizations priorities of desirable supplier characteristics.
Other notable studies closely related to supplier selection and contract allocations
are those conducted by Pan (1989), Parlar and Wang (1993) and Burke et al. (2007). Pan
(1989) proposed a linear programming model to optimally identify the number of suppliers
and their respective quantity allocations to meet pre-specified product requirements. The
objective was to minimize the price per unit as a weighted average of selected suppliers’
prices, where product demand was deterministic and supply was unlimited. Parlar and
Wang (1993) studied strategic sourcing (single source vs multiple sources) by comparing
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the costs of single versus dual sourcing for a firm assuming that the overall objective was
to minimize purchasing and inventory related costs. They used an EOQ and newsboy based
ordering policy and demonstrated that dual sourcing was preferred when supplier yield was
a random variable. Burke et al. (2007) extended the Parlar and Wang (1993) study by
implementing an optimization approach to determine whether a product should be single
sourced or sourced from multiple suppliers depending on demand uncertainty. The authors
concluded that single sourcing was as effective strategy only when diversification offered
no benefits and the supplier capacities were larger than the product demand.
2.3

Addressing risk management in strategic sourcing
Sawik (2014) had noted that the academic research on sourcing decisions such as

supplier selection and quantity allocation under disruption type risk is very limited. Though
supply chain risk management related research has grown in the last few years, it is
primarily focused on the manufacturing supply chain much like the literature for supplier
selection in general.
Risks associated with sourcing can be either strategic or operational. Researchers
have found that the prevalence of either type of risk depends on industry and the very
definition of risk categories (Bunker et al. 2016, Gandhi et al., 2012). This dissertation
focuses on the risks associated with operationalizing a chosen sourcing strategy, where the
sourcing strategy may cause disruptions due to the variabilities in daily operations. One
strategic risk under consideration is the risk of negative financial outcome, which presents
itself if quantity discount levels are not met due to physician preference for certain medical
devices. Physician preference is the physicians’ reluctance to use substitutable, comparable
products from alternate vendors. The other risks considered by this dissertation are
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operational risks. Examples of operational risk are the risk of service disruption, the risk
of poor service quality, and risk of service level agreement failures (Bunker et al. 2016).
These operational risks have also been classified as performance failure disruption type
risks by DuHadway et al. (2017). The authors defined performance failure type disruptions
as those occurring due to an inadvertent act that occurs within the supply chain itself. The
authors’ recommended risk detection methods were supplier audits and supplier
development. Rao et al. (2017) also recommended that better supplier evaluation and
selection, can effectively reduce a chain’s operational risk. Supplier scorecards are often
used to keep track of supplier performance and are a good supplier audit tool. This
dissertation uses a relevant scorecard to account for the supplier characteristics that may
indicate the risk presented by unacceptable supplier performance. DuHadway et al. (2017)
in their literature review found that risk can be reduced by using reliable suppliers (Tomlin
2006), and creating a risk management processes (Finch, 2004). They further found that
needed for disruption recovery, are a multiple sourcing strategy (Giunipero and Eltantawy,
2004) and suppliers with volume flexibility (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009). Though
these studies do explore the theory behind supply chain risk management, they lack
quantitative models that can be implemented in practice.
Studies that do take a mathematical modeling approach to the process of supplier
selection in the context of supply chain risk management, utilize a supplier selection
criteria, a weighting criteria for supplier ranking, and a classification of the risks to be
considered in the selection process. Two recent works by Paul (2015) and Mavi et al.
(2016) use a fuzzy model approach discussed a fuzzy model approach for strategic sourcing
(specifically supplier selection) so as to manage supply chain risk. Paul (2015) identified
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eighteen qualitative and quantitative selection criteria (the sources of this selection is
unclear, it may have been from literature and/or practice) with three verbal rankings for
each criteria; low, medium and high. The quantitative criteria were; percentages of
defective items, percentage of delayed deliveries, average annual price increment and lead
time. The qualitative criteria were supplier’s demand flexibility, adequacy of transport,
adequacy of inventory management, environmental performance, financial stability,
response to technological change, reputation, adequacy of disruption management,
compliance standards, and information technology system, commitment to quality, ability
to respond to unexpected demand, commitment to continuous improvement, and ability to
meet specifications. Hypothetical data were used for five suppliers. A total of 168 rules
were created in a Matlab module for the fuzzy optimization algorithm that related input
(selection criterion) to output (ranking). An example, stated by Paul (2015, p.662) for a
rule is “if the demand flexibility is high, the supplier ranking index is very high, and (ii) if
the percentage of defective items is high, the supplier ranking index is very low.” Multiple
combinations of the various rankings were computed by the program and a supplier was
recommended. The acknowledgement of risk of conducting business with a particular
supplier was quantified in the form of a couple of supplier selection criteria (financial
stability, adequacy of disruption management). The other incorporation of uncertainty in
the model was by considering triangular and Gaussian membership functions for the input
and output variables. Mavi et al (2016) recommend using fuzzy multiple attribute decisionmaking methods given the inaccuracy in assessing the relative importance of supplier
attributes and performance ratings. The authors further recommend using Shannon entropy
for weighting the selection criteria and ranking suppliers. Quality, on time delivery,
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performance history, supply risk, demand risk, manufacturing risk, logistics risk,
information risk, and environment risk were chosen as the supplier selection criteria. Fuzzy
triangular numbers were generated using expert opinion to rank suppliers on each of these
criteria. Upon weighting the criteria using Shannon entropy, demand risk was found to be
the most important supplier selection criteria, while environmental risk was found to be the
least important supplier selection criteria. Final recommendation on supplier ranking and
selection was made using these weights and corresponding supplier rankings. Though
using an interesting approach to address uncertainty created by subjectivity in selection
criteria and ranking, neither of these studies addressed quantity allocations or
diversification. Such studies are relevant for supplier ranking with consideration of risk,
but inadequate for strategic sourcing.
Another recent study on supplier selection used a combination of precise and fuzzy
variables for supplier attributes. Rao et al. (2017) used a two-stage compound mechanism
based on multi-attribute auction and supply-chain risk management is designed for
selecting the suppliers. The study utilized two sets of criteria for supplier selection, namely
commercial criteria such as quality, price, quantity, and delivery time and supply chain risk
criteria such as technology risk, information risk, management risk, economic risk,
environmental risk, societal risk, and ethical risk. All the commercial attributes were
precise numbers whereas the risk attributes were coded as linguistic fuzzy numbers i.e.
potential, low, medium, and high. A multi-attribute decision making mechanism was
designed to select the final set of suppliers. In the first stage, the suppliers were shortlisted
depending on how closely their bid matched the buyer’s procurement requirements. In the
second stage, the grey correlation degree of mixing sequences was used to evaluate and
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rank the shortlisted suppliers under the seven risk attributes and four commercial attributes.
The study concluded that a mechanism of ranking suppliers based on the risk they present,
would incentivize them to submit their cost and other corporate information (such as ethical
practices) for risk evaluation. An actual case setting would be required to substantiate this
claim.
Lee and Chien (2014) proposed a vendor selection and order allocation
methodology using a portfolio optimization model with consideration of risk
diversification and delivery uncertainty. Two stochastic programming models, robust
optimization (RO) and probabilistic models were compared. Robust optimization addresses
parameter uncertainty such that the uncertainty model is deterministic and set based. The
RO model was intended to produce one optimized solution for all uncertainty scenarios
and the probabilistic model was intended to produce a solution for each scenario. The
models required vendor diversification as a risk mitigation strategy and for competitive
pricing. The risks in the vendor selection process were the unsystematic risk of vendor
performance deviation and delivery uncertainty. The multi-objective optimization model
had three objectives; maximizing overall performance of selected vendors, minimizing
total risk, and minimizing total costs. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed two
optimization models three strategies were compared as benchmarks: performance-oriented
strategy, risk-oriented strategy, and the Sharpe ratio. The performance-oriented strategy
claims that the decision maker would allocate orders to vendors in terms of performance
ranking. The risk-oriented strategy claims that the decision maker would always like to
minimize the risk in a portfolio regardless of cost. The Sharpe ratio suggests making a
trade-off between performance and risk based on maximizing the return per unit of risk,
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i.e. maximizing performance-over-risk ratio without consideration of cost. In comparing
the results of the two models it was found that the probabilistic model always selected more
vendors than the RO model. From a managerial standpoint, the RO model was found to be
easier to implement since it gave a quick solution to be implemented.
Sawik (2014) explained that supplier selection is a strategic initiative while day to
day manufacturing order allocation is a tactical initiative. Blending of these two types of
decision hierarchies, while introducing allowances for risk, was handled using MIP
formulations. To model such a problem the author used a three stage supply chain (supplier,
focal firm, customers) with probabilities for disruptions in each hierarchy and the option
to single source or dual source materials. The risk measure is defined as “value-at-risk”
which was a service level. The objective was to maximize customer service level and the
expected service level in a worst case scenario. It was found from a comparison of single
and dual sourcing strategies that for both the risk-neutral and the risk-averse solutions with
lower confidence levels, a low price, higher risk supplier was selected to minimize cost or
a high cost, more reliable supplier was selected for maximizing customer service. In
general supplier reliability was found to be a more important parameter than price
competitiveness when risk was introduced into the model. The study assumed that, though
reliability of suppliers differed, the product they offered was comparable in quality. Sawik
(2015) extended their earlier study by introducing cost minimization along with customer
service level maximization under disruption risks but dropped the single and dual sourcing
aspect of the study. The problem was modeled as a stochastic mixed integer program with
weighted goals. When the objective was to minimize cost, the model resulted in the largest
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unfulfilled demand. When the objective was to maximize the service level, the solution
resulted in the least unfulfilled demand.
The Burke et al. (2007) study mentioned earlier also serves as a good example of
modeling risk. Demand uncertainty was used in the model as a proxy for risk. They defined
a diversification benefit function to extend the traditional newsvendor model to incorporate
strategic diversification. In a scenario, where suppliers’ minimum order quantities are not
fixed (unlike bulk buys where these are fixed), it was concluded that most of the product
should be ordered from the least costly supplier with marginal amount being allocated to
other suppliers. In a scenario, where supplier minimum order quantities are fixed (like bulk
buys where these are fixed), flexibility of supplier may have greater bearing on selection
than pricing flexibility. This study serves as good foundational resource for this
dissertation. However, it focuses only on pricing as a vendor attribute in their model and
assumes all suppliers are equally reliable.
Babich et al. (2007) explored the trade-offs faced by a retailer between
diversification and pricing competition, when the suppliers were market competitors and
their business was dependent on each other. They used the theory of financial options and
represented supply chain disruptions as a Bernoulli random variable. This analysis included
only highly risky suppliers that could possibly default on their contractual agreement. The
assumption in the paper was that the buyer has the option to defer ordering decisions until
demand in the system unfolded and the supplier has the option to defer the pricing decision.
In their model with two suppliers and deterministic demand, it was found that pricing
benefits outweighed the diversification benefits. With more than two suppliers, Babich et
al. (2007) found that there was a scenario where wholesale pricing as well as diversification
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benefits could be achieved as long as two suppliers were highly co-dependent competitors.
The analysis assumed perfect substitutability of product. In general, the authors concluded
that pricing benefits outweigh diversification benefits. They also concluded
(unsurprisingly) that suppliers who compete with one another would benefit from
diversifying their customer base. This dissertation drops the constraint of studying only
highly risky suppliers and generalizes the model to drive purchasing strategy overall. Also,
the inclusion of physician preference as a driver of purchasing makes the dissertation
oriented towards a specific healthcare problem.
Kumar et al. (2003) took a fuzzy goal programming approach for vendor selection
in a case study where data available for the goals was vague and goal values could vary.
This introduced uncertainty into the models (with uncertainty being a proxy for risk). Three
minimization goals were selected as vendor criteria; net cost, items returned, and late
deliveries subject to primary constraints of vendor’s maximum capacity, flexibility in quota
and budget allocation. Quantity discounts were not considered in the study and product
demand was assumed to be constant with no uncertainty involved. In the scenario selected
for study, four vendors with varying performances on each of the three goals were used.
The fuzzy goal programming approach allocated zero quantity to the vendor with the worst
performance on all three goals and highest quantity to the supplier with maximum supply
capacity and average performance. The study did not consider any risk mitigation strategies
such as diversification in the modeling efforts.
Ding et al (2005) used a simulation-optimization approach to address the
uncertainties associated with the supplier selection process. Following Kumar et al (2003),
risk was modeled in the system through uncertainties in demand and lead time (e.g.
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transportation lead-time follows normal distribution or exponential distribution). The Ding
et al (2005) study used a Genetic Algorithm (GA) optimizer, a discrete event simulator
(DES) and a supply chain modeling software. The ‘fitness value’ (equivalent to an
objective function in mathematical formulation or goals in goal programming) was defined
by the authors to be made of various KPIs of the practitioner’s choosing. In the case study
presented by Ding et al (2005), a textile company and its suppliers are studied with the
intention of re-designing the process of supplier selection and transportation route
selection. The ‘fitness value’ in this case study was made of four KPIs: purchasing costs,
transportation costs, inventory costs and penalty cost associated with total missed demands.
The objective was set to minimize the summation of all four costs. Every supplier was
given four attributes (FOB (Free on Board) price, duties, supply lead time, and waste ratio)
with input from the case study and a weightage attribute that was determined by the GA
optimization model. Various combinations of suppliers and transportation routes were
simulated and the resulting KPIs were compared. The results of the sim-opt modeling
delivered an optimal set of suppliers and order quantities to be purchased from them. The
study though detailed and substantiated with real data, did not develop a risk mitigation
strategy. There were no requirements for diversification or redundancy in the supplier
portfolio.
2.4

Procurement decisions in service industry supply chains
Wang et al. (2015) conducted an extensive literature review of service supply

chains in three main areas i.e. service demand management, service supply management,
and coordination of service supply chains. They classified service supply chains as ‘service
only supply chains’ (e.g. financial consulting) and ‘product service supply chains’ (e.g.
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healthcare). In the review, the authors identified performance-based contract issues, and
supply management with disruption risk as two important supply management issues.
Healthcare service issues were identified as one of the important demand management
issues in service supply chains. Interestingly, the authors found that similar to
manufacturing, service supply chain buyers can orchestrate competition among the
suppliers, prompting improved service quality through the supplier selection and market
share allocation strategies (which allocates a proportion of demand to each supplier with
respect to the quality of service promised). The authors concluded that in service supply
chain management, industries such as IT and telecommunications, electricity, and finance
have been popularly examined in the operations research (OR) literature. However,
industries such as healthcare have not been well-explored in OR journals. This finding
further highlights the importance of the research presented in this dissertation.
Though information technology (IT) and healthcare were found to be the most
common study settings for procurement research in the service industry, the effect of user
preference for certain products has not been studied in detail in either of these settings. The
Ravindran et al (2010) discussion about procurement models in an IT industry resonates
closely with the line of inquiry of this dissertation. The authors approached the multiattribute risk adjusted supplier selection problem using four variations of goal
programming (GP) models i.e. pre-emptive GP, non-pre-emptive GP, Tchebycheff GP and
fuzzy GP. The supplier risk was defined as a function of two dimensions of risk, severity
of impact and frequency of occurrence. Different levels of these two dimensions created
either a disruption (named MtT, modeled as Taguchi’s loss function) or disaster (named
VaR, modeled as a generalized extreme value distribution) type of risk in the supply chain.
35

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Phase 1 of the study ranked a list of 20 suppliers by 14 attributes related to delivery, price
etc. Phase 2 used four of the fourteen attributes; lead time, quality, cost and risk
(represented by variables VaR and MtT) in the objective function of the optimization
model. Results from phase 2 were used to compare the different goal programming models.
Each model performed differently for each goal allowing the user to decide which model
to implement depending on which goal was most important to them.
Specific to hospital procurement related research, Jacobsen et al. (1999) used
integer programming to illustrate the use of operations research methodologies for vaccine
procurement and delivery. Using various objective functions such as cost minimization,
cost maximization, and cost minimization with constraints on manufacturers selected, the
study highlighted how the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention can create a set of
operations research tools to guide vaccine procurement. The study highlighted the loss of
cost competitiveness when supply redundancy has to build into the procurement process
by allocating market share to all manufacturers.
More recently, Karsak and Dursun (2015) used a healthcare setting to test a fuzzy
logic supplier selection model. The procurement department of the hospital was found to
use three supplier selection attributes; cost, quality, and delivery. Additional criteria of
product volume, payment method, supply variety, reliability, experience, location,
management and business relation were obtained from literature. Further it was found that
there were five fundamental product characteristics relevant to the healthcare setting; cost,
quality, product conformity, availability and customer support, and efficacy of corrective
action (which may be related to product recalls but was not elaborated on by the authors).
Weights for the criteria were assigned by interviewing procurement and clinical
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employees. Also interdependencies among the selection criteria were obtained through the
interviews. There were no quantity allocations calculated and the model was mainly used
to rank suppliers. Physician preference was not accounted for in this study - perhaps
because the study was conducted in Turkey where healthcare procurement may function
differently.
Extending the typical definition of strategic sourcing to include corporate social
responsibility, Knight et al (2017) modified a traditional spend analysis process framework
to identify savings opportunities that allow a hospital to achieve strategic purchasing and
social responsibility objectives. Traditional spend analysis entails collecting historical
spend data, finding and prioritizing appropriate candidate item categories to renegotiate,
and engaging vendors to achieve better contractual rates. To enhance the traditional
approach, the authors employed regression analysis to examine the eﬀect of sustainability
initiatives and acquisition planning decisions on purchasing, using “transactional savings”
as the dependent variable. The regression's independent variables were selected based on
the organization's strategic goals and operating environment. Examples of independent
variables includes small business status, open market purchase, and contract value. This
model allowed the organization to identify characteristics of potential strategic partners
that supported the sustainability goals outlined by the organization. The case study
however, did not extend to the identiﬁcation of strategic vendors or the eﬀectiveness of
these partners to realize cost eﬃciencies or to meet the chosen sustainability goals. Thus,
such a selection might result in the choice of a vendor who may not offer the most
competitive pricing.
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Kros et al. (2018) focused their attention on the role of buyer-supplier relationship
and information management in healthcare inventory procurement and management, using
transaction cost economics (TCE) and contingency theories, and survey methodology. The
authors focused on a specific channel of inventory management, namely the use of
healthcare inventory vending machines. As applied to the adoption of inventory vending
machines, TCE was used to explain why certain activities are outsourced (in this case
managing inventory) while contingency theory was used to explain why hospitals should
focus on patient care type activities given that is their core competency. The authors
recognized user behavior in healthcare where clinicians often bypass inventory
management teams and directly contact vendors to fulfill their product needs. Managing
inventory in such situations is obviously more difficult especially if there is no information
management (regarding the inventory) between the hospital and the vendors. Survey
responses from 130 healthcare professionals were used to collect data for hypotheses
testing. From the hypotheses tested (hypotheses were related to the roles of information
management and quality of buyer supplier relationship in vendor managed inventory in
healthcare) in the research, the authors concluded that quality of relationship quality did
not have a direct significant effect on the cost of healthcare vending machines or inventory
management benefits. However, quality of relationship had a significant indirect positive
effect the two variables through information management as the mediating variable.
Finally, the authors concluded that the quality of buyer-supplier relationship may not
always impact performance directly, which was a different conclusion than other literature
pertaining to vendor managed inventory.
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2.5

Summary
Academic research regarding strategic sourcing has evolved as the practitioners

have recognized supply chain sourcing as a core strength instead of just a buying function.
As practitioners try to build resiliency in the supply chain by identifying the risks involved
in sourcing, it is important that academicians provide tools and methodologies to help with
these risk management decisions. Much has been written about the role of vendors, the
process of contract negotiations, and the risks inherent to these decisions. The research here
adds to the current body of knowledge related to strategic sourcing by using healthcare as
a setting and recognizing its unique characteristics such as physician preference. It does so
by recognizing physician preference as an obstacle to contract negotiation and procurement
strategy design. The study discusses diversification strategies as seen in previous literature
but goes one step further and uses a mathematical model to test trade-offs between
diversification and total cost. Also, as recommended in academic publications, this
research captures vendor characteristics via a scorecard. This further ensures that any
vendor characteristics that may introduce disruptions in the supply chain are adequately
captured and represented in the quantitative model. From a methodological view, although
DEA has often been found to be the most common approach for supplier selection
problems (Fahimnia et al., 2015), it is ill-suited as a methodology for creating a
procurement model. Generally used in literature for finding an “efficient” group of
suppliers, DEA is a linear programming based technique for measuring and comparing the
relative performance of organizational units (such as suppliers) with multiple inputs and
outputs. Applying DEA for the intended research in this dissertation would mean assuming
all suppliers offer the exact same product (or combinations of products) and blending
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procurement strategies in any proportion would have no effect on market share of suppliers
thus allowing the same volume discounts to continue. Both these assumptions are incorrect
and not in alignment with the goal of this research where it is intended to study the
economic consequences of change in market share on price tiers.
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3

Analytical model research framework

Analytical models help examine how a chosen strategic objective is impacted by variation
in modeling parameters. In this research the objective is minimization of the total purchase
cost post rebate and penalties associated with minimum score violations. The parameters
that affect the objective are minimum number of vendors required for supply diversity
(defined by market share), minimum vendor scores required for each performance
scorecard dimension, rate of product substitutability at a product and category level (which
depends on the flexibility of physicians to accept alternative devices or accessories in the
same category), and bulk buy parameters for quantity discounts. The analytical model
research framework consists of a discussion of the supply chain structure under study, the
problem description, and modeling approach. These are discussed in the next few sections.

3.1

Supply Chain Structure

A simplified healthcare supply chain structure is illustrated in Figure 2. This general
representation of the main functions shows the flow of product requests and product
through the various echelons (manufacturers/suppliers, central sourcing, central
warehousing, and hospitals) as described next. The hospital system serving as the setting
for this dissertation has this business structure as well and the important participants in the
supply chain are:
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Medical Device
Manufacturer/ Supplier

Product Request Flow

Hospitals

Product Flow

Central
Sourcing

Central
Warehouse

Figure 2: Schematic of the healthcare supply chain
1. Medical Device Manufacturers/Suppliers – Every product category can be offered
by single or multiple vendors. Generally, vendors negotiate contracts through the
central sourcing departments or GPOs. There of course, may be, non-compliant
vendors that may reach out to individual hospitals/physicians to facilitate product
usage. Vendors can send product to the central warehouse or directly to hospital
warehouses depending on the type of products.
2. Central Sourcing – The vendor facing department of the supply chain that handles
functions related to supplier/vendor relationship management, vendor selection,
vendor compliance, creating and maintaining vendor scorecards, vendor (supplier)
development, contract negotiations, contract maintenance, and implementing
strategic sourcing initiatives such as bulk buys.
3. Central Warehouse – The central warehouse in the supply chain receives physician
preference, high-value medical devices purchased in quantities stipulated by the
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sourcing contracts. The central warehouse delivers products to hospitals within 24
hours.
4. Hospitals – Hospitals have their own warehouses which receive product from the
central warehouse. These are then distributed by the supply chain personnel to
various stocking locations throughout the hospitals. The clinicians (nurses, doctors
etc.) pull product from these stocking locations for planned and unplanned medical
procedures thus generating demand. When these products are used in an operating
room or the cardia catheterization lab the clinical system records their usage and
captures the demand being generated.
With this multi-echelon supply chain structure, there are two main elements of process
flow to consider. Figure 2 shows product request flow and product flow.
i.

Product request flow
a. For non-bulk buy products - The requesters at the hospital create purchase
orders by department which are aggregated and sent to the purchasing
department. These requests are then sent to the vendor or manufacturer.
b. For bulk buy products - The requesters at the hospital send product requests
directly to the central warehouse. The central sourcing department reviews
product stock at the central warehouse, hospital warehouses, purchase
history, and product usage. They then co-ordinate with the purchasing and
distribution departments to create orders for the items that need to be
replenished. The product orders are processed, sent to the vendor, and stock
is delivered to the central and local warehouses.

ii.

Product flow
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a. For non-bulk buy products – Products are sent directly from the vendor /
manufacturer to the hospital warehouses.
b. For bulk buy products - Products are sent to the central warehouse and then
distributed to the hospital warehouses.
3.2

Problem Description

Implementing cost containment strategies, such as efficient product procurement, can be
challenging when the ultimate users are unwilling to use alternate products. Complicating
the procurement problem further, is the fact that not all product suppliers are comparable
in terms of their product offerings and business performance. Choosing the appropriate
supplier (either in terms of cost or scorecard performance) may conflict with the users’
preference for that supplier. In this dissertation, user preference is represented by the
physicians’ preference to use certain products amongst all available supplier products.
Thus, the problem presented here is designing a strategic procurement plan that
accommodates the use of preferred products and limitations on what products may be used
as substitutes for them (driven by overall constraints on percentage of instances where
substitutions for preferred product can occur and paired vendor substitutions), bulk buy
rates, minimum vendor score expectations, and desired vendor diversification.
This procurement problem is addressed using an appropriate MILP optimization cost
model that recommends procurement quantities of unique SKUs (identified by index p) in
category c from a vendor v. The model allows restrictions on percentage of instances where
a substitute item can be used for a preferred product (at a product and category level).
Further restrictions can be imposed in a pairwise fashion that limit the proportion of
particular substitutes that can be purchased as alternatives to the preferred product. For the
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model, it is assumed that there is always a uniquely preferred product and it may be
substituted by other products in the same category from the same or different vendor. It is
also assumed that, category-level demand is determined as the sum of the demands for
products as preferred items that compose the category. Satisfying the demand at the
category level allows the planned medical procedure to be successfully completed.
3.3

Model construction

To address the problem stated in the previous section, a mixed-integer mathematical
programming model with options to adjust bulk buy rates, minimum vendor score
expectations, desired vendor diversification and physician preference, is employed to
determine optimal procurement quantities of product category to be purchased from a set
of vendors. Details of the optimization model’s objective and constraints, the decision
variables, parameters, and data used are presented in the next section.
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4

Optimization Model

Optimization models are often used in procurement for supplier selection, quantity
allocation, buyer-supplier relationship negotiation, and quantity discount planning. The
mixed integer linear programming model employed for this research allows us to design a
purchasing plan with consideration of key decision parameters, namely, physician
preference, vendor market share, supplier scorecards, and quantity discount tiers.
In section 4 we discuss the design and testing of the optimization model beginning with an
enumeration of the assumptions, formulation, and data.
4.1

Model description

First the assumptions employed to build the mixed-integer mathematical programming
model are described. We follow this with the formulation of the optimization model
including details about the model objective, sets of variables, parameters and constraints.
4.1.1
i.

Model assumptions
We assume that there is no supplier inter-dependence and suppliers do not depend
on each other to fulfill customer demand. Analysis of vendor supply-chain structure
is outside the scope of this study. A pooled interdependence is assumed, which
indicates that each vendor uses independent inputs and makes independent
contributions to the organization, with no inputs from another vendor in selection
pool (Chakraborty & Philip, 1996). Such interdependencies need only be
considered for studies focusing on supplier development, which is also outside the
scope of this study.
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ii.

We assume that supplier capacity is unlimited and they can fulfill demand for all
purchase quantities allocated to them.

iii.

Consideration of disruption risks arising from stochastic demand are deferred for
future research. We assume that category demands are deterministic and
independent. For example, lead wires are a category of accessories. These can be
consumable accessories that may wear out sooner than the main product. Their
demand can also be considered independent of pacemakers or defibrillators since
they can sometimes be used as accessories for older models of the products. We
acknowledge that while this assumption of independent demand may be true for the
categories being used in this dissertation in other categories, the assumption may
need to be revised.

iv.

We assume that if allowable substitutes are used, patient outcomes are the same.
Though no formal outcomes analysis has been conducted, the observations and
physician inputs over time have indicated that product categories being considered
for negotiations usually have the same patient outcomes, even when a substitute
product is used. If outcomes data are available at a future date, it would make an
interesting extension to this research.

v.

We assume that every product is associated with a single product category. Similar
to the vendor interdependencies, we assume that there are no interdependencies
within products in different categories. Every unique product SKU can belong to
one category only but a single category can consist of multiple unique
SKUs/products
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vi.

We assume that there is always a uniquely preferred product and it may be
substituted by other products in the same category from the same or different
vendor.

vii.

We assume that category-level demand is determined as the sum of the demands
for products as preferred items that compose the category.

4.2

Optimization Model Formulation

This section describes the sets, variables, and constraints used in the MILP model
formulation.
Sets:
P: Set of individual product SKUs p under consideration
C: Set of product categories c
V: Set of vendors v
CV(v): Set of product categories offered by vendor v
VC(c): Set of vendors offering products in category c
PCV(c, v): Set of products offered in category c by vendor v
SC (c): Set of products in a category
SP(p): Set of possible products that may serve as a substitute for product p
PS(p): Set of possible products for which p can substitute
P{p,s(p)} : Set of products p and potential substitutes s (possible combinations of p and s)

Parameters
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐 : Expected demand for products in category c (in units over the planning horizon)
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𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Expected demand for product p as the preferred product in category c from
vendor v (in units over the planning horizon)
𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Unit price of product p from vendor v before quantity discount is applied
𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Total unit volume of purchases in category c required to qualify for bulk buy
discount from vendor v
M: Large number used to relax constraints
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Price score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible price score granted for items in category c
𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒: Lower bound on index representing achievement of price goal for products used
in category c, across all vendors
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Quality score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible quality score granted for items in category c
𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙: Lower bound on index representing achievement of quality goal for products used
in category c, across all vendors
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Service score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible service score granted for items in category c
𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣: Lower bound on index representing achievement of service goal for products used
in category c
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Innovation score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible innovation score granted for items in category c
𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜: Lower bound on index representing achievement of innovation goal for products
used in category c
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Delivery score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible delivery score granted for items in category c
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𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙: Lower bound on index representing achievement of delivery goal for products used
in category c
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Operational excellence score of vendor v for product p within category c
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible operational excellence score granted for items in category
c
𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥: Lower bound on index representing achievement of operational excellence goal
for products used in category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate price points for products in
category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate quality points for products in
category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate service points for products in
category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate operational excellence points
for products in category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate delivery points for products in
category c
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate innovation points for products in
category c
maxmktshrc𝑐 v𝑣 : Maximum percentage of demand in any product category that can be
covered by a single vendor
𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐛𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐜𝒄 𝐯𝒗 : Percentage reduction in price of items in a product category that occurs
when qualifying threshold is met
𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐩𝒑 : Maximum portion of demand for product p that is substitutable
𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐜𝒄 : Maximum portion of demand in a product category that may be met by
substitute products
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𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐢𝐫𝐩𝒑 𝐬𝒔 : Maximum portion of demand for product p that may be satisfied by
substitute product s
𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫 : A small inflation in price when products are used as
substitutes instead of preferred products.

Decision Variables and Derived Variables
𝒕𝒒𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄 𝒗𝒗 : Total quantity of product p from category c from vendor v to be purchased as
either the preferred product or substitute for other products
𝒒𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄 𝒗𝒗 : Quantity of product p from category c from vendor v to be purchased as the
preferred product
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒑𝒑 𝒔𝒔 : Quantity of product p purchased as a substitute for product s
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒑𝒔 𝒔𝒑 : Quantity of product s purchased as a substitute for product p
𝒒𝒕𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒄 𝒗𝒗 : Binary variable indicating whether purchases from vendor v in category c are
sufficient to qualify for a quantity discount on purchases in that product category (only one
discount tier in consideration)
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 : Magnitude of rebate earned for products in category c from vendor v
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for price metric
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for service metric
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for quality metric
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for operational excellence metric
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for delivery metric
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for innovation metric
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Objective Function

For a strategic sourcing model, various objectives can be considered. Relevant examples
include minimizing total cost of ownership, minimizing total supply cost, minimizing
variability in supplier performance (Talluri and Narasimhan, 2003), goal programming
approaches to minimize deviation from expected performance goals (Talluri, 2008),
minimizing cost of bids (Sandholm, 2007) and others. For the purpose of this study, the
objective is chosen to be minimization of total purchasing cost (also referred to as supply
spend) with penalties for failing to meet scorecard standards. Fixed costs such as
administrative costs and supplier maintenance costs involved in contract negotiations are
not considered in the objective function since these do not vary. The primary aim of the
supply chain is to reduce the incurred purchasing cost of the products and hence that is the
only cost considered in the optimization model. The MILP model can be structured to
accommodate other business rules related to fixed and variable costs, penalties related to
market share violations, limits on vendor supply quantities etc. The MILP model in its
current format can accommodate data for a larger set of suppliers and products as well. We
expect solution times to increase for larger data sets making this problem, in its generic
form, a NP hard problem. The mathematical formulation of the objective function and
constraints follows.
Minimize total spend shown in equation (1) defined as total cost of products purchased (as
preferred and substitutes) net of bulk purchase the rebates earned, plus penalties for
scorecard deficiencies. Potential penalties for scorecard violations were used to ensure that
devices and supplies would be provided for all planned medical procedures (while
minimizing aggregate penalties) and signal when constraints were violated. Any solution
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with a penalty for scorecard violations implies that conflicting constraints occurred in the
respective scenario (i.e., hard constraints would result in “no feasible solution”).
∑𝑣∈𝑉(∑𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑣} ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) + ∑𝑝∈𝑆𝐶{𝑐} ∑𝑆∈𝑆𝑃{𝑝}(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠 ∗
𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) − (∑𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑣} 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ))

+

∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑐 )

+

∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 )

+

∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑐𝑐)

+

∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑐 )

+

∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑐 ) + ∑𝑣∈𝑉(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐 )

(1)

The rebate (in dollars) can only be achieved if the purchase quantity meets the stipulated
bulk buy volume for quantity discounts and binary constraints on the quantity-discount
indicators
Constraint 𝑹𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Constraint to earn rebate
The rebate (in dollars) can only be achieved if the purchase quantity meets the stipulated
bulk buy volume for quantity discounts.
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ≤ M* 𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣

∀c ∀𝑣 where M is a large number

(2)

Constraint 𝑸𝑻𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Constraint for bulk volume needed
Equation (3) sets a binary rebate qualifying variable to be less than or equal to the total
purchased amount from the vendor (or vendor category) / minimum product volume
required to qualify for rebate. Here bulk buy percentage refers to a percentage increase in
business (i.e. historic usage) needed to qualify for price discount.
𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ≤ (∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )/𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 for each v, for each c𝟄 CV {v}

(3)

Constraint 𝑨𝑴𝑻𝑹𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Constraint for rebate magnitude
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Magnitude of the rebate is calculated as a percentage of the total spend on the products
purchased as preferred and substitutes in a category for each vendor. The RHS of Equation
(4) indicates the upper bound on the dollar magnitude of rebate.
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ≤ (∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) for each v and
each c𝟄 CV {v}

(4)

Equations (5) – (10) impose the scorecard requirements on the vendors. In general, all the
scorecard constraints state weighted average score for each vendor must exceed a stipulated
minimum score or incur an appropriate penalty. The aggregate scorecard deficiencies are
multiplied by estimated penalties for each unit of deficiency in the objective function. The
magnitude of the penalties are estimated to be large enough so that it is never advantageous
to incur a penalty. The scorecard constraints are designed so that they may be imposed at
the product level if required. The hypothetical scorecard generated for the experiments in
this research are generated at the category level but this structure of constraints can easily
accommodate product level scores.
We state each constraint first as a weighted scorecard metric and then linearize it so it
represents an aggregate metric.
The first of the scorecard dimensions is the product price metric. This indicates the
vendor’s cost competitiveness.
Constraint 𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗: Weighted price metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) / ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜 * 𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) for each c, v

(5)

Constraint 𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate price metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − (( 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )))+𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 for each c, v
(5L)
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The second scorecard dimension is quality. This metric measures the supplier’s
performance on offering high quality medical devices.
Constraint 𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Weighted quality metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) / ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜*𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙) for each c, v

(6)

Constraint 𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate quality metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙) ∗
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )))+𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 for each v

(6L)

The third scorecard constraint is the service metric constraint, which ensures that suppliers
who have a history of providing good service are chosen.
Constraint 𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗: Weighted Service metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) / ∑𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑐} ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) for each v

(7)

Constraint 𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Service metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) ∗
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ))) + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0

for each v

(7L)

The rate of technological advancement in the medical device industry is understandably
fast. A hospital’s suppliers are an essential partner in ensuring that products used are
modern and in keeping with current technological trends. A competent supplier should
have a good understanding of medical technology and should share information product

55

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
development information with the providers. The innovation score indicates a supplier’s
willingness to share their product development pipeline with the healthcare organization.
The innovation metric constraint outlines the requirements placed on a suppliers in regards
to this constraint
Constraint 𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑶𝑽𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Weighted Innovation metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )/( ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜) for each v

(8)

Constraint 𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑶𝑽𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Innovation metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜) ∗
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ))) + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 for each v

(8L)

If a supplier cannot deliver product on time (either through a distributor or selfdistribution), then the organizations runs the risk of stocking out of product. In worse case
situations this may cause cancellations of medical procedures. From a supply chain risk
management perspective, the delivery metric truly captures the suppliers most likely to
cause disruptions in the supply chain. Given the importance of on time deliveries and fill
rates, equation (9) captures the bounds imposed on the required score for the supplier’s
delivery metric.
Constraint 𝑫𝑬𝑳𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗: Weighted Delivery metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )/( ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜 * 𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙) for each v

(9)
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Constraint 𝑫𝑬𝑳𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Delivery metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑐 ) ∗
( ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ))) + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 for each v

(9L)

Operational excellence is an additional element of service which indicates the overall
willingness of suppliers to co-operate in efforts to control costs through continuous
improvement. It also indicates the supplier’s willingness to supplier to take responsibility
for the design, manufacture, and warranty of their products. Equation (10) outlines the
requirements for the minimum score needed to qualify a supplier on this attribute.
Constraint 𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑿𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Weighted Operational Excellence metric constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )/( ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )) ≥
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥) for each v

(10)

Constraint 𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑿𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Operational Excellence metric
constraint
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}( 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) − (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥)*
( ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 )) + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 for each v

(10L)

Constraint 𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑷𝒄 𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Balance constraint for total quantities purchased as
preferred or substitute products
Total product purchased is equal to the sum of product purchased as a preferred product
and product purchased to substitute for other products.
𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 + ∑𝑠∈{𝑃𝑆(𝑝)} 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠

for each p (and associated c & v)

(11)
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Constraint 𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑪𝒄 : Limit on total product substitution to meet category demand
(sp)
Quantity of product purchased as a substitute for product p is less than or equal to the
maximum allowable percentage of substitutions needed to satisfy category level demand.
∑𝑝∈𝑠𝑐(𝑐) ∑𝑠∈𝑆𝑃(𝑝) 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠 𝑠𝑝 ≤ maxpctsubc𝑐 * 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐 for each c

(12)

Constraint 𝑳𝑰𝑴𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝒑 𝑺𝒔 : Limit for total substitutes for product p (sp)
The constraint in Eq (13) limits the total number of substitutes, in aggregate for each
product p. Thus the sum of quantity of product purchased as a substitute for product p
(left hand of the equation) is less than or equal to the allowed percentage of substitutions
to satisfy demand of product p purchased
∑𝑠∈𝑆𝑃(𝑝) 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠 𝑠𝑝 ≤ maxpctsubp𝑝 * 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 for each p

SP(p)

(13)

Constraint 𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝑨𝑰𝑹𝑷𝒑 𝑺𝒔 : Limit on pairwise substitutes (sp)
The constraint in Eq 14 limits the number of substitutes for each specific product-substitute
pair. We derive these pairwise substitutions from a hypothetical vendor substitutability
matrix discussed later. This means that products from vendor A may be substituted for
products from vendor B but not vice versa. Products can be substituted as long as the
original product and the substitute product belong to the same product category and an
appropriate vendor. The pairwise substitution restrictions are implemented using the
maxpairp𝑝 s𝑠 parameter for maximum allowable pairwise substitutions. Section 4.3.4
describes how the data for paired vendor substitution were generated. These substitutions
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can easily be imposed as a more granular level and different substitution matrices may be
experimented with.
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠 𝑠𝑝 ≤ maxpairp𝑝 s𝑠 * 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 for each p & s𝟄 SP(p)

(14)

In the Introduction chapter, we referred to PPI (Physician Preference Items) products. One
of the primary parameters affecting the objective of cost reduction is the willingness of the
physicians to use a less costly product but equally effective product from an alternative
vendor. The example in Table 2 illustrates alternative products for a particular type of
pacemaker.
Table 2 : Example of substitutable products
SKU

Description

Category

Vendor

1

EVIA HF-T53 mm Ã— 49 mm Ã— 6.5 mm/27 g,RF-

CRT-P

1

CRT-P

1

CRT-P

3

Implnt-N,Mntrng-Land,Uni/Bi,6.4 yrs
70

CONSULTA 15 cc/ 26 gm,RF-Implnt-N,MntrngWire/Cell,Bi,7.7 yrs

85

Viva CRT-P Device

In this example, SKU 1 can be substituted by SKU 70 and SKU 85. Similarly, SKU 1 can
be used as a substitute for SKU 70 and SKU 85. As seen from the example, all substitutes
must be in the same category but can be from the same or different vendor.
Equation (15) represents the physicians’ preference for by using a substitutability
parameter maxpctsubp𝑝 and historical product usage indicating the proportion of
acceptable substitutable products in a category. The constraint models physician preference
in product demand.
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Constraint 𝑵𝑶𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝒄 𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Non Substitutable Demand Constraint
The quantity purchased of each product as the preferred must be sufficient to satisfy the
non-substitutable demand
𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 >= 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 * (1-maxpctsubp𝑝 /100) for each p (and associated c & v)
(15)

Constraint 𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑪𝒄 : Category Demand Constraint
Successful procurement processes are those that ensure the demand is fully satisfied at the
lowest possible cost, without comprising quality. The supply – demand constraint in
equation (16) ensures that total products purchased from all vendors will be greater than or
equal to the demand for a category.
The demand for each category must be covered by purchases of either preferred or
substitute products.
∑𝑣∈𝑉𝐶{𝑣}(∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉 {𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) ≥ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐

for each c

(16)

Constraint 𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑷𝒄 𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Product Balance Constraint
Total demand for an individual product must be covered by preferred or allowable product
substitutes.
∑𝑠∈{𝑆𝑃(𝑝)} 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠 𝑠𝑝 + 𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 for each p

(17)

Constraint 𝑴𝑺𝑪𝒄 𝑽𝒗 : Market Share Constraint
The market share constraint in equation (18) restrains a vendor’s market share (in dollars)
for a product category. This constraint ensures that a single vendor does not get all the
purchase quantity allocated to them every quarter thereby producing vendor
diversification.
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Equation (18) states that the total value of products before discount for each vendor cannot
exceed the maximum allowed dollar market share of expenditures in each category
∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) ≤ maxmktshrc𝑐 v𝑣 *
∑𝑣∈𝑉 ∑𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}(𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣 ) for each v and c

(18)

Lastly, all variables are nonnegative and technically integer (except for bulk commodities)
but most purchase quantities are likely to be of sufficient magnitude to allow rounding to
integer values as a reasonable approximation. Thus, the only integer variables in the model,
as solved, are the indicators of whether quantity discount thresholds are met for each
vendor in each product category.

The optimization model as formulated, in its generic state, is NP-hard. The purchase
quantities were sufficiently large where rounding did not have a material impact on the
magnitude.. Also the size of the current data set is modest enough to not present issues with
the solution times. The model solves in less than one minute. It is possible that the solution
times may increase if that vendor and product data sets are larger.

4.3

Data

The data for the optimization model consist of products SKUs, their price, and demand.
These data are discussed in the following sections. Products are identified by unique SKUs
which are associated with a particular product category and vendor.
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4.3.1

Product data

Supporting data for high value medical devices and supplies were collected from eight
facilities in a large healthcare system with academic and community hospitals. An
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system provided 12 months of historic usage
information. The hospital system has a central supply-chain department that negotiates
contracts for medical devices and supplies through the Central Sourcing team. To
concentrate on costly PPIs, we choose products in the Cardiac Rhythm Management
(CRM) area as shown in Table 3. These were all the vendors and product categories in the
CRM area when this data was collected. These products include expensive items such as
cardiac pacemakers, defibrillators, and lead wires – all of which have a high degree of
physician preference. There are nine product categories, four vendors, and 217 unique
products. A single category can have multiple unique SKUs. A SKU is unique to a category
and cannot be shared across categories. Table 3 shows the summary of product offerings
in the nine categories from the four vendors. Vendor 3 historically provided the largest
number of SKUs. The Cardiac pacing leads or electrodes (PM) product category is the
largest category with 46 unique products in it.

Table 3: Summary of unique SKUs (by category and vendor)
Category
Number

Product Category

(cnum)

Vendor Vendor Vendor Vendor
1

2

3

4

2

4

3

2

Total

Cardiac
1

resynchronization

11

therapy pacemaker
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Category
Number

Product Category

(cnum)
2

3

4

Cardiac pacing leads
or electrodes (PM)
Cardiac pacing leads
or electrodes (LV)
Cardiac pacing leads
or electrodes (HV)

Vendor Vendor Vendor Vendor

Total

1

2

3

4

5

7

21

13

46

4

7

11

5

27

7

8

10

10

35

5

9

5

4

23

5

7

4

5

21

5

7

3

7

22

Cardiac
5

resynchronization
therapy defibrillator
Implantable

6

Cardioverter
Defibrillator Dual
Chamber
Implantable

7

Cardioverter
Defibrillator Single
Chamber

4.3.2

8

Pacemaker-Dual

4

4

7

4

19

9

Pacemaker-Single

4

3

4

2

13

Total

41

56

68

52

217

Product pricing

The actual product costs and total supply spend have been masked to protect the hospital’s
financial data. Instead, the “cost index” indicates the relative product price offered by a
vendor in comparison to average price of the product category. The non-weighted cost
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index is created by taking the average price of a vendor’s products in a category and
comparing it to average price of all products in that category. Thus, a higher cost index for
a vendor indicates a relatively more expensive product. Table 4 shows the product cost
indices by vendor and category. Though vendor 1 is cheaper overall there are categories
for which they are not the cheapest. Similarly, though vendor 4 is the most expensive
vendor overall there are categories for which other vendors are more expensive (See
Category 2 cost index, for example). From an annual spend perspective, for the data
collected, categories 1 and 3 account for 4% of the total spend each, category 2 accounts
for 3% of the total spend, category 4 accounts for 8% of the total spend, category 5 accounts
for 34% of the total spend, category 6 accounts for 16% of the total spend, category 7
accounts for 13% of the total spend, category 8 accounts for 16% of the total spend, and
category 9 accounts for 2% of the total spend.

Table 4: Historical product cost indices
Vendors
Categories
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1
0.874
1.003
0.652
0.91
0.846
0.907
0.892
1.078
0.979

2
0.993
0.943
0.903
1.036
0.982
0.963
1.031
0.911
0.919

3
1.026
1.058
1.174
1.018
1.091
1.065
1.016
1.037
1.013

4
1.107
0.995
1.271
1.036
1.082
1.065
1.061
0.974
1.089

Overall cost index

0.891

0.982

1.054

1.073

-
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4.3.3

Demand data

There are two types of demand to be considered in the formulation of the optimization
model as discussed below. In either case we estimate that future product demand is
assumed to be an extension of historic product usage
a. Category level demand (“cv” demand)
Category demands are determined as the sum of the demands for products as preferred
items in a category. Product usage in the last year was used to determine demands for
individual products, which, accumulated by category, also determined demand at the
category level. Figure 3 shows the weekly historic product usage over a 12-month period
for each of the nine product categories. The historic usage data used for this research were
collected from various clinical information systems and enterprise resource planning
systems. As is seen from Figure 3, the weekly product demand is small in magnitude,
sporadic (or intermittent), and stationary. This is typical of expensive Cardiac Rhythm
Management. Their usage would not be expected to be as frequent as something like
syringes or bandages which are commodity products.
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Figure 3: Variation in product demand (in units) across categories over time
(weekly aggregate)

Table 5 shows the annual category level demands for the products, by vendor.
Table 5: Annual category level product demand
Category
number
1

Category
Cardiac
resynchronization

Total
Vendor Vendor Vendor Vendor
Category
1
2
3
4
Demand
15

23

27

67

132
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Category
number

2

3

4

5

6

7
8
9

Category
therapy
pacemaker
Cardiac pacing
leads or
electrodes (PM)
Cardiac pacing
leads or
electrodes (LV)
Cardiac pacing
leads or
electrodes (HV)
Cardiac
resynchronization
therapy
defibrillator
Implantable
Cardioverter
Defibrillator
Dual Chamber
Implantable
Cardioverter
Defibrillator
Single Chamber
Pacemaker-Dual
PacemakerSingle
Grand Total

Total
Vendor Vendor Vendor Vendor
Category
1
2
3
4
Demand

112

444

896

363

1,815

20

48

172

159

399

43

166

208

128

545

25

70

244

97

436

29

82

137

39

287

15

99

80

28

222

132

210

526

64

932

50

30

61

16

157

441

1,172

2,351

961

4,925

Table 6 shows the historical dollar market shares for the vendors for the various
categories.
Table 6: Historical percentage dollar market shares
Vendors
Categories

1

2

3

4

1

10%

17%

20%

54%

2

5%

23%

51%

21%
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Vendors
3

3%

9%

43%

46%

4

7%

31%

38%

24%

5

5%

15%

58%

23%

6

9%

27%

50%

14%

7

5%

49%

34%

12%

8

15%

19%

60%

6%

9

29%

18%

41%

12%

8%

23%

50%

19%

Overall % market share

b. Product level demand (“pcv” demand)
For non-substitutability constraints at the product level (eq 14) product-level demand data
are needed. This demand is estimated from past historic usage. Table 7 shows a sample of
annual product level demand by vendor for category 1 products.
Table 7: Sample product level annual demand in units (For Category: Cardiac
resynchronization therapy pacemaker)
Vendor

SKU

Annual unit usage

1

1

10

1

145

5

2

63

8

2

64

3

2

103

8

2

165

4

3

70

5

3

85

11

3

158

11

4

106

64
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Vendor

SKU

Annual unit usage

4

115

3
132

4.3.4

Vendor substitutability data

One of the constraints in our model refers to the extent to which different vendor products
can be substituted for each other in each category of products. This type of vendor
substitutability restriction was highlighted as a major procurement concern by the
executives of the healthcare system used in this study. Generating vendor product
substitutability data is an essential step to study the effect of the substitutability parameters
on the optimization model output. This will determine in what proportion certain products
from a vendor can be substituted by products from another vendor (in the same category).
An example of paired vendor substitutions is shown in Figure 4 below. The vendors in the
columns can serve as a substitutes for vendor in a row if the cell contains “1”. Such “one
way” or paired vendor substitution restrictions may be due to proprietary product
requirements, regulatory restrictions etc. The two dimensional array showing vendor to
vendor substitutability can be broken down to generate tables showing one-way vendor
substitutions. The difference between the tables in Figure 4, is most effectively illustrated
by using vendor 2 as an example - products from vendor 2 can be substituted by products
from vendor 3 but vendor 2 cannot offer products to substitute for other vendor products.
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Figure 4: Vendor paired substitutability
(Vendor in column may substitute for vendor in row)
V1
V1
V2
V3
V4

Vendor table for products that serve
as substitutes
Original
Vendor

Substitute
Vendor

1
1
2
3
4

3
4
3
1
3

V2
1
0
1
0

0
1
0
0

V3
1
1
1
1

V4
1
0
0
1

Vendor table for products that
each product may substitute
Original
Vendor

Substitute
Vendor

1
3
3
3
4

3
1
2
4
1

The substitution logic is illustrated using two examples below.
Example 1 (Figure 5): Product number 1 (from category 1 offered by vendor 1)
To determine which products can serve as substitutes for product 1, we refer to the table
on the lower left in Figure 4. Per Figure 4, substitute products for product 1 can be found
in category 1 offered by vendor 3 and vendor 4. Using this mapping, we find there are 5
products that can serve as substitutes for product 1 as shown below in Figure 5.
We now refer to the table on the lower right in Figure 4. Per the table, product 1 can be
used as a substitute for products in category 1 offered by vendor 3. Using this mapping, we
find there are 3 products that can be substituted by product 1. The illustration below shows
both these substitutions.
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Figure 5 : Illustration of paired vendor substitutability (Example 1)
Products that can
serve as a substitute
for product 1
70
85

Preferred
product
1

106

Products that can
be substituted by
product 1
70
85
158

115
158

Example 2 (Figure 6): Product number 10 (Category 2, Vendor 2)
To determine which products can serve as substitutes for product 10, we refer again to
Figure 4. We see that the substitute products for product 10 can be found in category 2
offered by vendor 3. Using this mapping, we find there are 21 products that can serve as
substitutes for product 10.
To determine which products can be substituted by product 10, we refer to Figure 4. Per
Figure 4, products from vendor 2 cannot be used as a substitutes for any other vendor
products. Thus there are 0 products that can be substituted by product 10. The illustration
in Figure 6 below shows both these substitutions.
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Figure 6 : Illustration of paired vendor substitutability (Example 1)

Products that can serve as
a substitute for product
10
16, 22 , 23, 33, 41, 48,
49, 86, 87, 128, 130, 156,
159 , 160, 163, 189, 201,
202, 203, 204, 215

Preferred
product

Products that can be
substituted by
product 10

10

NA

To demonstrate the different structures of restrictive paired vendor substitutability,
three hypothetical cases are shown in Table 8 below. Case A shows a substitutability
structure where all vendors can offer substitute products for all other vendors. Case B
shows a somewhat more restricted substitutability scenario. Case C shows an even more
restrictive substitutability scenario. The structure shown in Case B is adopted for model
testing since it allows most substitutions yet is somewhat restrictive. This substitutability
matrix is applied for products in all categories. It is possible to create such matrices for
individual products. The ultimate goal of using this substitution matrix is to illustrate the
effect of the degree of substitutability on the savings that can be achieved.
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Table 8: Three hypothetical cases for paired vendor substitutability
Case A
V1 V2

Case B

V3

V4

Case C

V1 V2 V3 V4

V1 V2 V3 V4

V1

1

1

1

1

V1

1

0

1

0

V1

1

0

1

1

V2

1

1

1

1

V2

0

1

1

1

V2

0

1

1

0

V3

1

1

1

1

V3

1

1

1

1

V3

1

0

1

0

V4

1

1

1

1

V4

1

1

0

1

V4

0

0

1

1

Figure 7 shows, for Cases A, B, and C, distributions of the numbers of products for which
a product may serve as a substitute, and the numbers of products that can substitute a given
product. For example, for Case B, there are 77 SKUs which can serve as substitutes for
no more than 10 products. There are 76 SKUs for which there are no more than 10
substitutes.
It can also be seen that dispersion of the sets varies depending on how tight the pairwise
substitution matrix is set. In Case A (the fully substitutable matrix), there are 81 products
which can substitute for 30 or more products. In Case B, this same set is limited to 7
products. Also, in Case C there are more products that can substitute for up to 10 products
indicating that as the substitutability gets more restricted, fewer products can be used as
substitutes and be substituted.
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Figure 7 : Frequency distribution of sizes of substitution sets PS(p) and SP(p) for
Case A, B, & C
Case A

Case A: |PS(p)| Set
93

100

100
80

80
60

Case A: |SP(p)| Set
93

60

46

43

35

40

46

43

35

40

20

20

0

0
20
30
40
50
Number of substitutes for
Product p

0 to 20 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50
Number of products for which
Product p can substitute
Case B
Case B: |PS(p)| Sets

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Case B: |SP(p)| Sets

97
77
36
7
0-10 11 to 20 21 -30
30+
Number of products for which
Product p can substitute

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

116

76
13

12

0-10 11 to 20 21 -30 30+
Number of substitutes for
Product p
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Case C

Case C : |PS(p)| Set
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

165

27

20

5

10
20
30
40
Number of products for which
Product p can substitute

Case C : |SP(p)| Set
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

157

35

20

5

10
20
30
40
Number of substitutes for
Product p

The model output for all three cases is discussed in section 4.5.3 with all the relevant
model output discussions.

4.3.5

Vendor scorecard data
The healthcare organization used as a setting in this study had undertaken an

initiative for incorporating vendor scorecards into the procurement process. Balanced
scorecards were being designed to assess vendor performance on several key financial and
operational characteristics. Once formally implemented, scorecard ratings will be assigned
by management personnel from various supply chain functions (Sourcing, Distribution &
Logistics etc).
In optimization models, vendor scorecard information may be incorporated in
constraints which qualify vendors for supplying particular products, in the objective
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function as a goal to be achieved, or in both. In our preliminary discussions with supplychain leadership, it was readily apparent that mixing costs and scorecard measures in a
consolidated objective function was impracticable and reaching consensus on a
hierarchical set of goals would be challenging.

We therefore chose to incorporate

scorecard ratings in constraints which qualify vendors to supply products in a chosen
category. Additionally, this structure of the optimization model has the advantage of
allowing supply chain managers the flexibility to stipulate the minimum weighted average
score that a vendor must achieve on each performance dimension in each product category.
The weights can be dynamically adjusted for a new contract consisting of a new set of
products, vendors, and scorecard dimensions.
Scorecard ratings can be assigned by a few key individuals or a large group of
personnel that regularly interact with vendors. In our case, scorecard ratings will be
assigned by only a few key individuals. With this scenario in mind and to determine if there
were peculiarities in the rating process, six supply chain managers were presented with
balanced scorecards to rate four vendors for products in the Cardiac Rhythm Management
category. Scorecard dimensions under consideration were price, quality, innovation,
operational excellence, service, and delivery. Product price was known to the respondents
thus making the price score an objective metric. Other metrics were scored in a subjective
manner, depending on the rater’s perception of the vendor’s capabilities in key areas such
as technological advances, customer relationship management, operational efficiencies etc.
Figure 8 shows the consolidated scores from the 6 responses. The average scores
are on the higher end of the 1 – 5 scale indicating a potential rater bias to assign higher
scores.
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Figure 8 : 6 rater scorecard responses

We observed two key rater behaviors during the exercise. First, we observed rater
tendency to assign similar ratings to a vendor on all six dimensions for the different product
category groups. Second, we asked the raters to describe their rating process and observed
that the raters appeared to first select and score a particular dimension of interest to them
(not necessarily the one listed first in the scorecard instrument), and then score the rest of
the dimensions (perhaps in consonance with the dominant dimension). From these
observations and the consolidated scorecard shown in Figure 8, it was apparent that there
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were various types of rater biases in play during the scoring process. To appropriately
include vendor scorecard considerations in our optimization model, it was necessary to
study these biases and the various structures of vendor scorecards that they may produce.
Given that the small sample of raters and time sensitivity of the scoring process would
prevent us from implementing techniques used for mitigating these effects in mass surveys
(such as changing the order in which dimensions of performance are considered, repeating
the scoring exercise over various time periods etc.), our analysis was directed at first
simulating the biases and then testing the potential effects of these two rater biases on future
procurement plans.
The first bias addressed in our research is called common-methods bias or commonmethod variance and is attributable to “carry-over” or “halo” effects from one dimension
to another (Peterson and Wilson, 1992). Common-method bias occurs when systematic
variations in responses are caused by the measurement process or instrument used.
Common method bias can manifest itself in the rater’s tendency to root their perception of
vendor’s overall performance on one primary dimension or any previous dimensions. The
effect of this bias is that it can induce correlations in the ratings given to vendor
performance on the different dimensions. In our case, a respondent may tend to provide
ratings on one dimension similar to ratings on other dimensions in order to preserve
consistency with an overall assessment of the vendor’s performance. The second type of
bias is related to a rater’s tendency to be excessively optimistic or pessimistic regarding
supplier performance and provide all high or all low scores on a scorecard. The effect of
this bias is to shift scores upward or downward but without affecting the correlations
among the scores (Kauffman et al., 2010). To maintain cordiality, perhaps, respondents
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may feel pressure to provide positive answers or higher scores on measures (Chang, et al,
2010). Conversely, a rater’s recent negative interaction or experience with an organization
(on a financial transaction like a billing mistake, for example), can negatively affect the
rater’s impressions on unrelated dimensions leading the rater to assign low scores on all
dimensions. In fact, Conway and Lance (2010) stated that the assumption that self-reported
measures are routinely upward biased, is a common misconception thus necessitating the
incorporation of both high and low rater bias in our research. We do expect that the rater
bias will have a greater impact on the optimization model than the common method bias
since the scores would shift more to the extremes of the scale with rater bias. With this
background and understanding of biases in scorecard creation and to give fair consideration
to the potential effect of scorecards on procurement decisions, we first create a scorecard
model and then implement the hypothetical scorecards generated from this modeling
exercise in our optimization model.
We begin the modeling exercise by emulating a respondent’s thought process when
they are presented with a scorecard - the goal being to first replicate the common method
bias (i.e. replicate the rater’s perception of the interdependencies of dimensions and the
carry over effect thereof ) and then add in the rater bias to generate scenarios with high or
low vendor scores. We do not focus our attention on determining which particular
dimension that has greatest carry-over, as the sample size is small and the choice of
dominant dimension may change depending on the raters. Since research indicates that
most commonly, a rater’s perception of vendor performance is anchored in the relative cost
of a vendor’s product (Kramer, 2015), we choose product price as our anchoring
dimension. In this case a rater would rate every scorecard dimension relative to price. For
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example, a rater may expect that expensive products would be higher in quality. Their
scoring might reflect this perception i.e. higher price (indicated by a lower price score)
would be followed by a higher quality score. Another model for capturing rater thinking,
is one where the raters carry over their awareness of all prior ratings (not just the dominant
dimension) as they assign ratings on successive dimensions. In such cases, the rater first
identifies and rates the scorecard dimension most important to them. The raters will then
consider performance on the next most important dimension and assign a grade, but the
grade will be moderated by a carry-over effect from the previous dimension. This creates
a hierarchy in the dimensions which is induced by the rater’s perception of the importance
of the dimension. Accordingly, dimensions lower in importance (in the rater’s view),
would have lesser relative correspondence to the dominant dimension. In this approach,
the influence of the dimensions can be accommodated by creating a weighted effect on all
successive dimensions. We choose to simulate the first approach of rater thinking, where
all scores are rooted in the relative price of a vendor’s product. This is done both for the
simplicity of the model and anecdotal evidence indicating that price is the primary driver
even on non-financial performance metrics. Other models of scoring behaviors could of
course result in similar scores. Here we are just concerned with generating scores with
different hypothetical correlation patterns and not with the psychological mechanisms
involved.
Once we induce common method bias in the scores using our price-dominant
model, we next induce the rater score bias using a triangular distribution (minimum score
of 1, modal score defined by a systematic and random component, and a maximum score
of 5) with high and low fractiles to produce scorecards with higher and lower scores.
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Finally, we run multiple replications of our scorecard simulator to illustrate how multiple
raters participating in the scoring process may rate vendors on the scorecard. We use the
average of scores from all raters to create a consolidated hypothetical scorecard for each
vendor on each dimension for each product category.
We next discuss a generalized form of the scoring model used and then describe
the detailed implementation of our model and its results.
4.3.5.1 Modeling the scoring process
To model the scoring process, we assume that the rater is presented a blank
scorecard similar in structure to the one shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 illustrates the scorecard
for one category only. The rater would see such a scorecard for all categories. The vendor
names here have been de-identified but the raters would see the actual vendor names, the
pricing of product categories, and any other pertinent details. We assume the rater will
assess performance across all vendors for each dimension for every category. For example,
the rater would score all vendors on “price”, then score all vendors on “quality” etc across
all categories. In our approach we assume the rater will score metrics from quality to
service, with a reference to the price the vendor offers on their products.
Figure 9 : Sample scorecard for rater input for one category
Please rate the vendors on a scale of 1 to 5 on each of the dimensions for the following category
Category : ICD Single
Vendor
Price
Quality
Innovation Operational Excellence Delivery
Service
1
2
3
4
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To simulate this rater thinking, in our model, the scores are generated for every category
and vendor on all six dimensions. This is achieved using a position ratio which determines
the position of the score likely to be achieved relative to the maximum score on the scoring
scale. Once we determine this position, a modal (or most likely achieved score) score for
the triangular distribution is determined by having a systematic component caused by
carry-over from an objective measure such as price or previous ratings plus a random
component for rater perception. The triangular distribution with high or low fractiles allows
us to generate scores that emulate the rater’s tendency to give a high or a low score. This
actual score is generated once for every replication in the scoring model to impose an
individual rater’s input on vendor score.
For the scoring model, we define the following parameters:
𝛼1 : Weight given to systematic influence of an objective metric for dimension 1
𝛼𝑗 : Weight given to carryover of systematic influence from dimension 1 to dimension j
(1 - 𝛼𝑗 ): Complementary weight of random component
j: index indicator for dimension being scored
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟: Maximum possible relative price factor (across all vendors and
categories)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 : Maximum achievable score on any dimension (In this scorecard, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
= 5)
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 : Maximum achievable score on any dimension (In this scorecard, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
1)
unif [0, 1]: Uniform distribution between 0 to 1

For every vendor v, category c, and replication r
Position ratio for 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 where j= 1 (Price)
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑐 = 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑣𝑐 / 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟

(19)
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Price score is in the inverse of price ratio (Vendors with higher price get a lower score on
cost competitiveness)
Modal score for 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 where j= 1 (Price)
𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜1 = 𝛼1 * (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 – (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 - 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑐 ) + (1 𝛼1 ) * (1+ unif [0,1]* (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒- 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ))
(20)

Position ratios for all remaining dimensions j=2 to m
𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 * (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜1)/ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + (1 - 𝛼𝑗 ) * unif
[0,1]

(21)

Modal scores for all remaining dimensions j=2 to m
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗 = 1 + (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)* 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗

(22)

The detailed implementation of this model to generate hypothetical scorecards is described
in subsection 4.3.5.2
4.3.5.2 Creation of Hypothetical Vendor Scores for Model Testing
Using these six metrics, the following steps are taken to create hypothetical scorecards:
1. A correlation matrix is created for simple correlations judged likely to exist
between ratings by asking for indications of the perceived degree of correlation that
would result as a person assigns scores to a vendor in that order. (See Table 8 for
example).
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2. This correlation matrix in step 1 is used to determine the hierarchy of the
dimensions (price being the dominant dimension). The sum of the absolute
correlation coefficients is used to create the hierarchy.
3. The model described in equations 18 – 21 is now implemented using the hierarchy
identified in step 3 and using different 𝛼𝑗 values to induce common methods bias.
4. The cumulative probability of the triangular distribution function is used to create
rater bias toward low versus high fractiles for the scores. A graphical representation
of the triangular distribution is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Triangular distribution function
Most likely
achieved score

Lowest
score = 1

Highest
score =
5

5. Multiple replications (namely 5, 20, and 100) are run (to replicate input from 5, 20,
and

100

different

respondents)

with

lower

fractile to

generate

multiple scorecard values which are then averaged to derive one 'low-biased'
scorecard.
6. A correlation matrix of the aggregated scores is generated from the replications to
see if they followed the correlation patterns assumed in step 1.
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7. Steps 5-6 are repeated with higher fractiles to generate a ‘high biased’ scorecard
thus providing two scorecard structures, each representing the tendency of raters to
score high or low.
8. Finally, the high and low biased scorecard structures are used for testing the
optimization model response to rater bias.

Table 9 shows the scorecard dimensions used in this research. The judgmental correlations
in the table were supplied by a supply chain manager at the healthcare system (Refer to
step 1). The column sums of each dimension indicate the hierarchy of influence of the
metrics. No negative correlations were assumed among the scorecard dimensions. With
this particular rater’s input, Price (3.7) emerged as the most influential scorecard dimension
(which validates our assumption of a dominant dimension). Followed by quality (3.4),
innovation (3.2), operational excellence (2.7), delivery (2.4), and service (2.2).

Table 9 : Hypothetical correlation matrix with rater input
Price Quality
1

0.8

0.7

Operational
Excellence
0.5

Quality

0.8

1

0.6

Innovation

0.7

0.6

Operationa
l Excellence
Delivery

0.5

Service

Price

Sum

Innovation

Delivery

Service

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.3

1

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.4

0.4

1

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

1

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

1

3.7

3.4

3.2

2.7

2.4

2.2
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Using this dimensional hierarchy, Figure 11 shows the correlations that emerge on the high
and low biased scorecards generated from 100 replications using the model described in
equations 18 -20. Note the difference in “price ratio” and “pricesco”. Price ratio indicates
the relative cost index of a vendor for a category. “Pricesco” is the price score of the vendor
for a category. A higher price ratio indicates a more expensive vendor for a category which
leads to a lower price score. Figure 11 also provides details on the mean, minimum, and
maximum score generated for each dimension. The range of the mean, minimum, and
maximum score highlight the bias between the two scorecards. When common method bias
is high, we get correlations that match closely with the input correlations, especially
between price and other dimension. For example, the correlation between price and quality
is assumed to be 0.8. As is seen in Figure 11, the correlation on the generated scorecard is
0.7346. With a low common method bias scenario these correlations are significantly
lower. The common method bias however does not seem to have a great effect on the range
of scores generated. If the rater’s tendency is to give high scores then regardless of the
common method bias, the range of scores is quite close. For example, the mean quality
score is 3.53 with high common method bias and 3.58 with low common method bias. Note
that the mean price score is 3.42 in both the common method bias scenarios. This is due
the price score being an objective score that is derived from actual vendor price factors.
Also note that for the high common method bias scenario, the standard deviations are lower
since we make them agree most closely with the price score.
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We do clearly see the effect of the rater’s tendency to assign high or low scores. For
example, on the high common method bias- high rater bias scorecard the minimum score
on the price dimension is 3.2, with a maximum possible score of 3.7, and a mean score of
3.4. While on the low biased scorecard the minimum score for price is 1.5, with a maximum
possible score of 2.4, and a mean score of 1.9.
To replicate the scoring process in an organization with fewer respondents, we show the
correlations emerging from scores generated by 20 (Figure 12) and 5 (Figure 13)
replications. The average scores are quite close in all three cases. Better correlations
(compared to the hypothesized input in Table 8) emerge from scenarios with more
replications – especially for dimensions lower in hierarchy. For the purposes of testing the
effect of scores on the optimization model we use the scorecard generated from 100
replications.
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Figure 11: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (100 replications)
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Figure 12: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (20 replications)
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Figure 13: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (5 replications)
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The sample scorecards generated from these experiments were used for testing their effect
on optimization model output. We discuss this testing in the optimization experiments
chapter.

4.3.6

Other procurement data

Other relevant data regarding procurement and business processes were also gathered as
part of this research. Particularly, information on previous quantity discounts (individual
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purchase quantities and overall volume of business for the year) was collected. This was
used to estimate a reasonable range of bulk buy and rebate parameters for the optimization
model.
The negotiation period for contracts was also researched. Currently, most contracts for bulk
purchases are negotiated annually with purchase quantities stipulated for any given quarter.
The data collection highlighted the various procurement business processes, systems, and
decisions that need to be made by supply chain procurement managers in healthcare. The
next section illustrates the use of this knowledge to generate data for testing the model and
capturing the complexities of these decisions.
Section 4.4 describes the model output generated using input data discussed in section 4.3.
4.4

Model Testing Results

With the data setup discussed in the previous sections, we now test the deterministic
optimization model to see if it conforms with our axiomatic understanding of optimization
model behavior and business processes.
The MILP model is built using SAS 9.4 using the OPTMILP procedure as a solver. The
OPTMILP procedure implements the linear-programming-based branch-and-cut algorithm
(SAS Institute Inc., 2013.). This algorithm first relaxes the binary restrictions for the
quantity discount indicators and then systematically explores different possible restrictions
that force binary values where required. When an integer feasible solution is acquired, it
becomes a bench mark against which to evaluate other solutions. The search is terminated
when the gap between the objective function for the incumbent (best integer feasible
solution to date) and any outstanding relaxation that could become integer feasible is
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sufficiently small. The input data for the model are the product demands, scorecard data,
and price, as described in the previous sections.
Figure 14 shows a sample output from a single program run (Where all constraints are
relaxed and minimum scorecard indices are zero). The model has 3,787 variables of which
36 are binary variables. There are a total 7,157 constraints. 6,281 of which are less than or
equal to constraints, 434 are equal to constraints, and 442 are greater than or equal to
constraints. There are also 19,152 constraint coefficients. These constraints and
coefficients are derived from the equations (1) – (15) for the relevant product, category,
and vendor. The relative objective gap is 0.0001.
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Figure 14 : Sample SAS proc OPTMILP output

Table 10 shows a portion of a report for preferred and substitute product purchases. For
example, product #4 is purchased as a substitute for product #41, #49, #86, #128, and #202.
The relative price of 0.813 indicates that the unit price of product #4 is less than that of the
products it substituted. The total demand for the product #1 as a preferred product was 22.
Another 3 units were purchased to satisfy a portion of demand for product #41. Also 7 units
of product #4 were purchased to satisfy a portion of demand for product #49, 2 units were
bought to substitute #86, 4 units were purchased to substitute #128, and 13 units were
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purchased to substitute #202 thus making the total quantity of product 4 purchased equal
to 51.
Table 10: Sample of substitutes and preferred product purchases results

Table 11 shows a sample model report for a base case with maximum flexibility to reduce
costs. The parameters are set as follows: 100 percent product level substitutability allowed,
100 percent category level substitutability allowed, 100 percent max market share allowed,
all scorecard minimum indices are zero.
For this scenario, in category 1, the model recommends reducing vendor 4’s dollar market
share (with the highest price index of 1.106) from 53.8% to 0%. The purchasing volume
is instead allocated to the more cost competitive vendors 1 (price index 0.87) and 2 (price
index 0.99). However, for category 8, vendor 4’s dollar market share (with the price index
of 0.96) is increased from 6.1% to 11.5%. The total demand of 4,925 units reflects the
historic demand indicated in Table 5. This demand is satisfied by purchasing 1,441 units
of preferred product purchases and 3,484 units of substitute products purchases.
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Table 11: Sample model output with base case offering max savings
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4.5

Model testing

The purpose of model testing is to demonstrate how solutions from the optimizing model
may vary in response to tightening and relaxation of various constraints. The results from
the various model testing scenarios indicate that the deterministic model responds as
expected to linear changes in parameter levels. The objective function value (which is a
sum of the post rebate spend and any incurred scorecard penalties) increases as constraints
are tightened and decreases as they are relaxed.
Percentage cost savings, defined as the difference between past spend and current post
rebate spend, is used as the metric to measure the sensitivity of the optimization model to
the various parameter changes. Where applicable, vendor market shares are also used to
illustrate model behavior.
The effects of the model parameters, namely market share, substitutability (product
level, pairwise, category level), scorecard dimensions, bulk buy rates, and rebate rates, are
discussed in the next sections. To test the behavior of the model as parameters are changed,
first all constraints are relaxed and only the parameter constraint under consideration is
tightened to test the model’s behavior. The high-biased scorecard structure is used in the
testing (note that when the minimum scorecards requirements are set to zero, the scorecard
used is immaterial since all vendors are considered to be qualified). The next section shows
the results of this model testing.

106

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
4.5.1

Effect of market share parameters

Vendor market shares indicate what percent of the purchasing volume (either in terms of
units or dollars) is allocated to each vendor. The market share constraint expressed in the
model is defined in terms of the dollar value of purchases allocated to each vendor.
To ensure diversification of supply, almost every vendor may be allocated some purchase
volume. This is represented by a low maximum allowable market share parameter value
(e.g. 25%, 30%). A sole-source market would be reflected in a scenario where maximum
allowable market share is 100%.
Axiom 1: For a given product-level substitution, decreasing the maximum market share
decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding.
The other model parameters are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%
Table 12 shows a comparison of purchase quantities allocated in a highly diversified
scenario and in a sole-source scenario. When diversification is forced with the low market
share parameter, vendors with higher price indices are allocated some purchase quantities
driving up the overall purchase cost. For example, for category 1, the most expensive
vendor (vendor 4) is allocated 11.4% of the market share when maximum allowable market
share is 30%, but has no market share allocated to them when maximum allowable market
shares are 100%. The effect of alternative constraints on market shares on total
procurement cost is depicted in in Figure 16.
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Table 12 : Variation in purchase quantities with varying market share

Figure 15 shows the changes in percentage savings (savings calculated as the
difference between post-rebate spend and past spend) as a result of varying the maximum
allowable vendor market share. The savings range from 16.86% to 22.73% when the
maximum allowable market share is varied from 30% (when market is highly diversified)
to 100% (allowing sole sourcing).
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Figure 15 : Effect of market share parameter

Effect of marketshare
% Save (Past - Post rebate spend)

25.00%

22.73%
22.73%

20.00%

22.24%
16.86%

15.00%
10.00%
max market
share =100%

max market
share = 75%

max market
share = 50%

max market
share =30%

Generally the savings decrease as maximum vendor market share decreases. Another
interpretation of this result, is that vendor diversification comes at a cost – the trade-off in
this case being a decrease in savings as vendor diversification is forced. An interesting
observation is that the savings do not vary for market shares greater than 75%. This would
indicate that there are no additional savings generated by allowing a sole source
procurement strategy. Also, the savings generated by increasing maximum market share
from 50% to 75% increase by only about 2%. However increasing market share from 30%
to 50% increases savings by almost 32%.

4.5.2

Effect of product level substitutability

The product level substitutability parameter is used to indicate the degree of adherence to
physician preference.
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Axiom 2: For a given max market share, decreasing the maximum allowable product level
substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding.
The other model parameters are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; category, and pairwise
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%
Table 13 and Figure 16 show the changes in percentage savings as a result of varying the
allowed percentage of substitutable products. The savings increase as allowed product
substitutability increases. When estimating the cost of adhering to physician preference it
is easy to see that physician inflexibility in allowing substitutions decreases potential
savings.
Table 13: Effect of product level substitutability on savings
% product
substitutability
100
80
60
40
20
0
100
80
60
40
20
0
100
80
60
40
20

max market share

% savings

100
100
100
100
100
100
75
75
75
75
75
75
50
50
50
50
50

22.73%
18.85%
15.05%
11.43%
7.85%
0.00%
22.73%
18.85%
15.05%
11.43%
7.85%
0
22.24%
18.83%
14.95%
11.06%
7.60%
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% product
substitutability
0
100
80
60
40
20
0

max market share

% savings

50
30
30
30
30
30
30

NFR
16.86%
15.72%
13.3%
NFR
NFR
NFR

Figure 16: Effect of product substitutability and market share parameters
mktshr 75
25%
20% 22.73%

7.85%

10%
5%

Savings (%)

Savings (%)

mktshr 100
25% 22.73%
18.85%
20%
15.05%
15%
11.43%

18.85%

15%

15.05%

10%

11.43%

5%
100

80

60

40

20

100

% substitutability

80

20%
15%
18.83%
14.95%

10%

*Below this
solutions
NFR
100

80

Savings (%)

Savings (%)

22.24%

15%

0%

7.85%
20

mktshr 30

25%

5%

40

% substitutability

mktshr 50

20%

60

16.86%

15.72%
13.3%

10%

11.06%
7.60%
60

% substitutability

40

20

*Below this
solutions
NFR

5%
0%
100

80

60

% substitutability
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4.5.3

Effect of pairwise substitutability

For demonstration purposes, we apply the same percentage limit on all possible pairwise
substitutions to show the effect on model output. However, when using the model the
pairwise limitations between a product and its substitutes can be individualized.
Axiom 3: For a given max market share, decreasing the maximum allowable product level
substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding.
The other model parameters are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; category, and product level
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%
Figure 17 shows that as maximum allowable pairwise substitutability decreases the savings
decrease, with the effect being more pronounced at the lower substitutability percentages.
The cost savings range from 0% at 0% pairwise substitution to 22.73% at 100% maximum
allowable pairwise substitution.
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Figure 17: Effect of (overall) pairwise substitution parameter
25.0%

22.73%

20.0%

22.64%

22.3%

22.73%

% Savings

18.7%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0

10

20

30

50

100

% substitutability (pairwise)

Table 14 shows an example of the comparison of category level market shares for two of
the pairwise substitutability examples. Note that the overall product level substitutability
constraint has been relaxed by setting the overall substitutability to 100%. With the lower
pairwise substitutability of 20%, market share of 25.3% is assigned to vendor 3 even
though they are more expensive. Compared to the scenario where pairwise substitutability
is 100%, the 20% substitutability scenario generates lesser savings because of this market
share allocation.
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Table 14: Comparison of category 1 for effect of pairwise substitutability
Market share with maximum pairwise substitutability 20%

Market share with maximum pairwise substitutability 100%

Table 15 shows a comparison of the three structures for vendor substitutability discussed
in section 4.4.1 i.e. Full substitution, partial substitution, and restricted substitution. As
expected, the cost savings decrease as allowable substitutions are decreased. If full
substitution between vendors is allowed as in Case A, savings as high as 26.82% can be
achieved. Compared to Case A, with the restricted substitutions in Case C the maximum
savings that can be achieved are only about 12%.
Table 15: % Cost savings comparison for paired vendor substitutability
Max allowable
Max
product level
allowable
substitutability marketshare
100
100
100
75
100
50
100
25

Full
Substitution
Case A
26.82%
24.79%
23.05%
13.45%

Partial
Substitution
Case B
22.73%
22.73%
22.24%
13.41%

Restricted
substitution
Case C
11.94%
11.57%
9.94%
infeasible

114

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis

4.5.4

Effect of category level substitutability

The category level substitutability determines the category level demand that can be
satisfied by substitute products. This substitutability parameter can be varied for every
product category. For illustrating the effect of the parameter, the same substitutability value
is used for all nine categories.
Axiom 4: For a given category level substitution, decreasing the maximum allowable
category level substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding.
The other model parameters are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, and pairwise
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%
Figures 18 shows the increase in percentage savings as a result of increasing the maximum
allowable category level substitution. The savings can vary from 0% for 0% maximum
allowable substitution to 20.23% for 100% substitution.
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Figure 18: Effect of category level substitutability parameter
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20.00%
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0.0%
0
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80

100

% substitutability (category level)

4.5.5

Effect of bulk buy requirements parameter

The bulk-buy parameter represents the percentage increase in historic usage required to be
eligible for meeting the quantity discount levels. With this method of defining bulk buy
requirements, the required increase in usage is proportional to the historic usage (i.e.
historic purchases from a vendor). This does pose the risk of requiring small increases for
vendors with low historic usage and large increases for vendors with high historic usage.
Thus this approach of defining bulk buy requirements only applies for situations where all
vendors offer products in all categories i.e. where all vendors have comparable market
shares in each category. The resulting increase in usage required to meet quantity discount
levels will then be reasonable for all vendors. Another way of achieving quantity discounts
may be by purchasing a particular quantity rather than a change in quantity relative to
purchase quantity.
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Axiom 5: Increasing the bulk buy requirement decreases the potential savings as the
constraint becomes binding.
The other model parameters are as follows:
Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%;
Minimum scorecard indices = 0%
The parameter range chosen is from 10% - 100%. Though the bulk buy parameter results
are shown for a 100% increase in historic usage, increasing product usage by anything over
50% requires a considerable amount of usage compliance and standardization. From
observations, a 10% to 15% usage increase seems more realistic. Table 16 and Figure 19
demonstrate the effect of market share variation with the bulk buy parameter. It is
interesting to note, that when maximum vendor market share is 75% or higher, increasing
the bulk buy parameter percentage offers no increase in savings. This is presumably
because one vendor can own the entire market share and an increase in usage will not affect
the quantity discount tiers that are already met. At low market shares and very high bulk
buy percentage requirement, there is a sharp decrease in savings (See Table 15 market
share 30 column).
Table 16: Effect of bulk buy parameter on savings
bulkbuypct
10%
25%
50%
100%

max market
share =100
22.7%
22.7%
22.6%
22.1%

max market
share = 75
22.7%
22.7%
22.6%
22.1%

max market
share = 50
22.2%
22.0%
21.9%
20.8%

max market
share = 30
16.9%
15.6%
14.9%
13.8%
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Figure 19: Effect of bulk buy parameters on savings
maxshr =100,
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22.7%
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25%
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25%
20%
15%
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5%
0%
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20%
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10%
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100%
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25%
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Table 17 shows market shares of vendors for a few sample cases of categories where
quantity discounts were achieved. The market shares values shown in bold indicate a
category where the vendor offered quantity discounts. The “Count of Categories” row
shows the total number of categories where quantity discounts were earned under that
particular combination of bulk buy and market share values. Note that all scorecard and
substitutability constraints were relaxed for this testing. For example, in Case A and Case
B when the maximum allowable market share is 100%, the increase in required bulk buy
from 10% to 25% results in vendors offering quantity discounts in the same number of
categories. This is also reflected in the previous Table 15, where the savings remain at
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22.7% when bulk buy percentage changes from 10% to 25%. However the underlying
market shares can change as seen for categories 7, 8, and 9. In general, in the absence of
limits on market share, the business is always distributed to gain quantity discounts. Even
when the required bulk buy percentage increases to 100% (while the maximum allowable
vendor market share is 100%) as seen in Case C, potential savings drop only slightly to
22.1%, as seen in Table 16. Case D, however, shows the decrease in total number of
categories where quantity discounts were achieved, when the requirement for the bulk buy
(i.e. increase in purchases compared to previous purchases) is high and the allowable
maximum vendor share is very low. Also notice in case D, the individual market shares are
capped at 30% causing business to be distributed in such a way that quantity discounts
cannot be achieved. Thus the resulting savings are also very low. This scenario of course
provides more diversification of market shares. Another observation from Table 17, is the
consistency of quantity discounts offered by vendor 1 in each case. As was seen in the table
of relative cost indices (Table 4), vendor 1 is almost always the cheapest vendor for any
category. It thus follows that in the absence of any requirements of scorecard performance,
most of the purchases would be driven to vendor 1, and thus be eligible for quantity
discounts.
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Table 17: Vendors offering bulk buy discounts (Values in bold indicate a quantity
discount category)
Case A: bulk buy = 10%,
max market share= 100%
Categories
Vendors
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Count of
categories

Categories

1
29.3%
52.2%
40.1%
43.6%
58.1%
56.5%
32.1%
15.6%
58.6%
9

2
3
4
0
0
70.7%
0
0
47.8%
0
0
59.9%
0
51.9% 4.5%
0
0
41.9%
0
0
43.5%
0
49.2%
18.7%
0
72.8%
11.6%
8.7%
32.7%
0
9

0

2

Case C : bulk buy = 100%,
max market share= 100%
Vendors
1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

29.3%
52.2%
40.1%
32.6%
58.1%
41.6%
39.4%
0
59.4%

70.7%
47.8%
59.9%
62.9%
41.9%
58.4%
31.1%

0
0
0
4.4
0
0
0

84.8%
32.6%

0
0

29.5%
15.2%
7.9%

Count of
categories

8

7

0

2

4.5.6

0
0
0
0
0
0

Case B:bulk buy = 25%, max market
share= 100%
Vendors
1
2
3
4
0
0
1
29.3% 70.7%
0
0
2
52.2% 47.8%
0
0
3
40.1% 59.9%
0
4
43.6% 51.9% 4.5%
0
0
5
58.1% 41.9%
0
0
6
56.5% 43.5%
0
7
25.8% 55.6%
18.6%
0
8
17.7% 70.8%
11.5%
8.7%
9
58.6% 32.7%
0
9
9
0
2
Case D: bulk buy = 100%, max market
share= 30%
Vendors
1
2
3
4
30% 11.4%
1
28.6% 30%
30% 18.2% 21.8%
2
30%
30%
10%
3
30%
30%
30%
10%
4
30%
30%
30% 15.2% 24.8%
5
30%
30%
10%
6
30%
30%
30%
10%
7
30%
30%
30%
10%
8
30%
30%
30%
15.4%
9
30%
24.6%
8

1

0

4

Effect of rebate percentage parameters

The rebate percentage parameter indicates what percentage of costs will be returned to the
hospital post purchase once a quantity discount tier has been reached. Rebates are generally
credited back to organizations annually.
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Axiom 6: Increasing the rebate percentage increases the potential savings
The other model parameters are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%;
Minimum scorecard indices = 0%
The model is tested using the most commonly negotiated rebate percentages experienced
in the last few years in the healthcare organization. Since the range of rebates offered were
between 10% -20% of total purchase price, this range has been used to demonstrate the
effect of the rebate parameters. It is entirely possible to negotiate larger rebates than 20%
and it is possible that a supplier may offer a less than 10% rebate. However for the purposes
of demonstrating the effect of the parameter, this range has been used. Table 18 and Figure
20 shows the effect of varying the rebate percentage on the savings achieved. As expected,
the higher the rebate percentage, higher are the possible savings achieved from the
procurement process.
Table 18: Effect of rebate parameters on savings
rebate

max market
share =100%

max market
share = 75%

max market
share = 50%

max market
share =30%

10%

22.7%

22.7%

22.2%

16.9%

15%

27.0%

27.0%

26.5%

20.4%

20%

31.3%

31.3%

30.8%

24.0%

121

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Figure 20: Effect of rebate parameters on savings
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15%
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20%
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25%

30%
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25%

26.5%
22.2%

15%
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% Savings

22.7%
10%

35%

24.0%
20%
20.4%
15%

10%

4.5.7

27.0%

15%

20%

max market share = 50%

20%

31.3%

25%

15%
Rebate (%)

20%

16.9%
10%

15%
Rebate (%)

20%

Model Testing Summary

The purpose of this set of tests on the model is to confirm that the optimization model is
appropriately sensitive to key parameters, namely, the minimum number of vendors
required for supply diversity (defined by market share), minimum vendor scores required
for each performance scorecard dimension, the rate of product, category, and the pairwise
substitutability (which depends on flexibility of physicians to accept alternative devices or
accessories in the same category), and bulk buy parameters for quantity discounts. As
expected, when overall or pairwise product substitutability decreases the possible savings
decreases. For the market share parameter, sole source scenarios (where there is no limit
on market share) offer the highest savings. We notice the effect of parameter changes on
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the underlying vendor market shares even when the changes in savings are not significant.
When varying the bulk buy parameter, we find that that forcing diversification (i.e.
allowing very low maximum allowable market shares) while also asking for an increase in
product usage leads to fewer possible savings.
Having confirmed that the optimization model responds as expected to constraint
tightening and relaxing, we proceed to experiments that address our research questions.
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5 Optimization Model Experiments
With the optimization model validated in Chapter 4, we now implement the model to
generate some scenarios that using parameters we expect to be realistically used in the
business. We also discuss research questions 3 and 4 which pose inquiries regarding the
effect of subjective scorecards and planning horizons on optimization model output. To
that end we discuss experiments conducted using the optimization model in this chapter.
We first discuss the effect of scorecard ratings in section 5.1 and then the effect of planning
horizons in section 5.2. Finally, in section 5.3 we discuss savings generated using realistic
parameter combinations.
5.1

Effect of scorecard biases (common method and rater bias)

In this section we first discuss the meaning and effects of scorecard minimums. The
scorecard minimums stipulate the qualifying score that a vendor must earn to be chosen as
a supplier for a product in a category. The scorecard minimum indices are one of the
“levers” of the optimization model. In our research, we allow the model to incur penalties
when vendor scores do not meet required minimum scores. The purpose of the penalties is
to allow a solution to be generated from the MILP model for further resolution when
conflicting constraints result from unachievable standards for a given set of vendor scores
with stipulated market-share limits. We consider price to be the most important scorecard
dimension and accordingly failure to meet the price score has the highest penalty associated
with it. The penalty magnitudes are chosen to be large enough to ensure that its is never
more advantageous to incur penalties instead of purchasing product. Without such
precautions, the optimization model can inapproriately minimize total cost by incuring low
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penalties and to avoid higher cost purchases. We acknowledge that the search for an
optimal purchase plan in such instances may be terminated prematurely because the
integrality solution tolerance may be achieved relative at an objective value that is inflated
by the constraint-violation penalties. For that reason, we report those solutions as NFR
(needing further resolution). Further experimentation would be needed to devise penalties
that are meaningful in order to automate the resolution of conflicting constraints with
reasonable goal hierarchies. This may require different integrality tolerances or solution
tactics that would increase solution times. This work is outside the scope of this dissertation
and is an avenue for further research.
We present a few examples to demonstrate the impact of changing the required scorecard
minima. Let us assume a scorecard was used where Vendor 4 for category 3 earned a price
score of 1.6. If the minimum score requirement is 30% i.e. vendor score of at least 1.5 on
all dimensions, vendor 4 would qualify to supply products in category 3. However if the
minimum score requirement was raised to 35%, vendor 4 would not qualify (since the
minimum score needed now would be 5*0.35 = at least 1.75). However to be able to satisfy
demand, the optimization model would allow a penalty to be incurred on the Price (or Cost)
dimension as shown in Table 20. In this solution 10% of the market share is being allocated
to a sub-standard vendor (while violating the scorecard constraint for price).
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Table 19: Example to illustrate effect of scorecard minima

Another way to look at these minimums is from the point of view of the scorecard
constraints listed in equations (5) to (10). Figure 21 shows sample average category level
scores for vendor 1 on all six dimensions.
Figure 21: Sample average scores for vendor 1 (category level) – low rater biased
scores

Per the scorecard constraints, for a vendor to qualify the weighted scores have to be greater
than the minimum required scores. Figure 22 shows a comparison of the weighted scores
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and the total quantities purchased from the vendor 1. For category 8, with minimum
scorecard indices of 30%, 146 units of product were purchased from vendor 1. With 60%
minimum however, there were no purchases for category 8 made from vendor 1.
Figure 22 : Weighted scorecard report for vendor 1

As another example, assume the scorecard minimum was increased to 90% of the
maximum possible score (i.e, to 4.5). Note that the scorecards (and the scorecard minima)
are imposed across all products purchased from a vendor – i.e., deficiencies on one
product’s purchases may be offset by surpluses on another product category. Figure 23
shows that for category 7, vendor 1 is the cheapest vendor. In this case regardless of the
scorecard minimums, the model allocates purchases to the vendor 1 (by incurring penalties
for the score deficiences in columns titled ‘price def’, ‘quality def’, ‘service def’, ‘innov
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def’, ‘delivery def’, and ‘opex def’ shown in Figure 22). We report these solutions where
penalties are incurred as “Needing Further Resolution”. However, we use this example to
simply illustrate changes in market shares. For example in category 8, where vendor 1 is
the most expensive vendor, vendor 1’s market share goes down from 15.6% to 0%. These
are quite significant variations in market share in response to the changing scorecard
minimums.
Figure 23: Comparison of vendor market shares for category 7 and 8
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The resulting vendor market shares are just one metric to measure the effect of parameters
on the optimization model. The other metric is cost savings. As seen in Figure 24, the
potential savings that can be earned when the scorecard minimums are 0% and 30% are
very similar. When no scorecard minima are imposed, the vendor selection and resulting
cost savings depend on maximum allowed market share and maximum level of product
substitutability. The range of savings that can be earned with 0% and 30% scorecard
minimums is 7.6% to 22.73%. This is with maximum allowed market share and product
substitutability set at 100%.
The other model parameters used to generate the graph in Figure 24 are as follows:
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise
substitutability = 100%
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Figure 24: Effect of scorecard minimums on % savings

In summary, scorecard minimums affect the size of the set of vendors that the optimization
model may choose qualifying vendors from. Even when there are no pronounced changes
in savings we see significant changes in underlying market shares in response to changes
in scorecard requirements.
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5.1.1

Discussion of common method bias on scorecard structures

As discussed earlier, common method bias drives the correlations among the various
scorecard dimensions. It does not however cause much variation in the scores themselves.
The real driver behind variations in scores is the rater’s bias toward giving high or low
scores. See for example, in Figure 25, the high scores for vendor 1 with high common
method bias on the first four dimensions are 3.5 and service score is 3.6. With low common
method bias, the scores for the dimensions ranging from price to service are 3.5, 3.6, 3.5,
3.8, 3.7, and 3.8 respectively. Thus the scores produced are quite close to each other
regardless of the potential common method bias.
Figure 25 : Example of comparison of scorecards emerging from different common
method biases
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Since the scorecards emerging from the two common method biases are so similar, they do
not have a pronounced effect on the optimization output. See Table 21 for a comparison of
the savings generated using the two different scorecard structures. The savings are
comparable in all scenarios except for when the maximum allowable market share is 100%.
This advantage is probably achieved due to small score differences in price competitive
vendors.
Table 20: Comparison of savings for High (HCMB) and Low (LCMB) Common
Method Bias
pctsub

max market
share

% Save
(HCMB)

% Save
(LCMB)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%

30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
75%
75%

16.9%
15.7%
13.3%
NFR
NFR
NFR
22.2%
18.8%
15.0%
11.4%
7.8%
NFR
22.7%
18.9%

16.9%
15.7%
13.3%
NFR
NFR
NFR
22.2%
18.8%
15.0%
11.1%
7.6%
NFR
22.7%
18.9%
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pctsub

60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

5.1.2

max market
share

% Save
(HCMB)

75%
15.0%
75%
11.4%
75%
7.8%
75%
0.0%
100%
22.7%
100%
18.9%
100%
15.0%
100%
11.4%
100%
7.8%
100%
0.0%
NFR – Needs further resolution

% Save
(LCMB)
15.0%
11.4%
7.8%
0.0%
22.7%
22.7%
22.7%
20.3%
7.8%
0.0%

Effect of High and Low Rater Bias

To illustrate the effect of high low rater bias we reference the scorecard minimum case
presented in Table 22. At 40% scorecard minimum, the optimization model using high
scores does not incur penalties while the model using low scores does.
Table 21 : Scorecard minimum chosen for experimentation
scorecard minimum
percentage
requirements

Optimization Model
Solution status with
Rater Bias Towards
High Scores

0

No Penalties - Feasible

20

No Penalties - Feasible

30

No Penalties - Feasible

Optimization
Model
Solution
status with
Rater Bias
Towards
Low Scores
No Penalties
- Feasible
No Penalties
- Feasible
No Penalties
- Feasible

Score (1-5 scale)

0
1
1.5
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scorecard minimum
percentage
requirements

40
50
60
65

Optimization Model
Solution status with
Rater Bias Towards
High Scores

Optimization
Model
Solution
status with
Rater Bias
Towards
Low Scores
No Penalties - Feasible
Penalties –
NFR*
No Penalties - Feasible
Penalties –
NFR*
No Penalties - Feasible
Penalties –
NFR*
Penalties - Not Feasible
Penalties –
NFR*
*NFR – Needs further resolution

Score (1-5 scale)

2
2.5
3
3.25

Table 23 shows a comparison in savings achieved from the low and high rater bias
scorecards. As expected, the model using lower scores generates fewer savings since the
qualifying vendor pool is smaller (given that they did not earn the scores required to be
selected).

134

Parimal Kulkarni
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Table 22: Effect of high - low rater bias on optimization model output (Scorecard
minimum = 40%)
pctsub
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0

max market
share

% Save (High
Rater Bias)

% Save (Low Rater
Bias)

30%
17%
30%
16%
30%
13%
30%
NFR
30%
NFR
30%
NFR
50%
22%
50%
19%
50%
15%
50%
11%
50%
8%
50%
NFR
75%
23%
75%
19%
75%
15%
75%
11%
75%
8%
75%
0%
100%
23%
100%
19%
100%
15%
100%
11%
100%
8%
100%
0%
NFR – Needs further resolution

11%
11%
10%
NFR
NFR
NFR
20%
17%
14%
10%
6%
NFR
22%
18%
14%
10%
6%
0%
22%
18%
14%
10%
5%
0%

Similar to the effects of the scorecard minimums, we again note that subjective scores (with
their inherent biases) may affect vendor market shares when their effects are jointly
considered with rater biases.
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5.1.3

Summary of scorecard effects

The purpose of this section was twofold – to test the optimization model response to
varying scorecard minimums and to demonstrate the effect of common method and rater
bias on the procurement model.
For the first part, we find that upon varying scorecard minimums, we see dramatic change
in market shares for vendors, where a vendor’s market share may drop to zero based on the
subjective scores assigned to them.
For the second part, we see that common method bias produces very similar scorecard
structures and thus results in very similar savings generated by the optimization model.
The rater’s perception of the hierarchy and carryover effects of dimensions does not cause
much variation in the actual scores generated. In a scenario with just a few raters,
scorecards can be affected substantially by individual raters’ tendency to give higher or
lower scores than average. In this case average scores for raters converge more quickly to
their true averages than correlations due to common method variance converge to their true
values. Regardless, effects of common method variance were found to be minor compared
to rater biases toward high or low scores. The rater’s bias towards assigning low or high
scores relative to the norms chosen for the scorecard constraints lead to very different
scorecard and resulting procurement patterns.
5.2

Effect of Planning Period

Research question 4 explores the sensitivity of solutions to the planning period. Bulk
purchases are often made to coincide with fiscal planning periods like annual purchases or
quarterly purchases. The frequency with which these purchases are made determines how
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much buffer stock is available in the supply chain. Longer planning periods may result in
larger buffer stocks. Further there may be seasonality and unanticipated demand variations
especially during longer planning periods. To investigate these effects, we consider three
illustrative cases.
•

Case A: Create an annual purchasing plan using expected annual demand

•

Case B: Create a quarterly purchasing plan using expected demand derived from
annual data

•

Case C: Create a quarterly purchasing plan using expected demand data for the
relevant quarter

Table 24 shows the demand aggregation for each case. This demand information is used to
as input to the optimization model.
Table 23: Total Demand
Quarter
1
Case A

Annual demand (𝐴𝐷𝑐 )

Case B

Derived

2

3

4

1231.25

1231.25

1231.25

1170

1392

1247

4925

Demand 1231.25

(𝐴𝐷𝑐 /4)
Case C

Quarterly demand (𝑄𝐷𝑐 )

1116

Other model parameters are set as follows:
Maximum market share =100%, Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%;
product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%
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Table 25 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case A with
actual annual demand. As expected the total demand for 4925 products is satisfied as seen
in column titled “Total Qty”.
Table 24: Case A (Annual Purchase Plan) optimization model output

Table 26 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case B with
quarterly demand derived as a fourth of the annual demand. Again the model satisfies
demand with no extra purchases. The inferred annual total demand is 4925 units.
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Table 25: Case B (Derived Quarterly Demand) optimization model output

Table 27 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case C using
actual quarterly demand. Notice the historical demand is almost evenly distributed through
all four quarters of the year. As expected the total demand for products is satisfied in
accordance with the actual demand as seen in column titled “Total Qty”, with no excess
purchases. The inferred total demand is 4925 units.
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Table 26: Case C (Actual Quarterly demand) Optimization output
Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Quarter 4

Table 28 shows that the possible potential savings that can be achieved with all three
planning periods are identical.
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Table 27: % Savings comparison in various planning periods
Case
A (Annual Demand)

Savings
23%

B (Derived Quarterly Demand)

23%

C (Actual Quarterly Demand)

23%

However, it is interesting to note the fluctuations in underlying market shares with the
changing planning periods as seen in the example presented in Table 29. Vendor 1’s current
unit market share can fluctuate anywhere from 27% to 61.7% depending on the planning
period used. This seasonality in demand (seen in Figure 29 scenarios where actual quarterly
data is used) should be taken into account when negotiating bulk buy (i.e. quantity
discount) terms.
Table 28: Demonstration of changing market shares for Vendor 1 in Category 5
with different planning periods
Case Using

Historic Unit
Share

Current Unit
Share

Historic
Dollar Share

Annual Demand
Derived Qtr
Demand
Actual Q1 Demand
Actual Q2 Demand
Actual Q3 Demand
Actual Q4 Demand

5.7
5.7

61.7
61.7

4.6
4.6

Current
Dollar
Share
58.1
58.1

6.3
6.3
6.9
3.9

30.5
27
29.7
21.7

5.1
5.1
5.5
3.1

25.9
6.4
7.2
17.6

5.2.1

Summary of planning period effects

The comparison of these three cases highlights that irrespective of the planning period used
to accumulate the demand, the MILP model suggests purchase quantities to exactly satisfy
demand with no excess purchases. Thus the savings generated in all three cases of demand
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aggregation are nearly identical due to the almost even distribution of demand through all
four quarters. There may be instances where rounding the demand quantities for a season
may generate excess purchases in the final result. We acknowledge that the method of
deriving demand may affect how closely it resembles the actual demand. The seasonality
of the demand can cause variations in underlying vendor market shares. It may also pose a
challenge in reaching the expected quantity discount levels every quarter (if there are
periods with extremely low demand). While the product categories used here have almost
even demand throughout the quarter, other product categories may have significant
variation in demand. This variation could be ever more pronounced if the demand is
aggregated at monthly intervals instead of quarters. Hence if quarterly data are used to
negotiate contracts, the bulk buy levels and discount terms should be determined for that
particular quarter.
5.3

Implementation of the optimization model using realistic parameters

Using our knowledge about the business setting we present the joint effects of various
constraints and realistic parameter values on the savings and market shares. We expect that
to leverage quantity discounts, the healthcare system may want to limit vendor market
shares to a maximum of 40%. We also expect that they may allow some substitution
(compared to current substitutions at 0%). We thus use an overall product substitutability
of 35% in our scenarios and a category level substitutability of 20%. To model some
pairwise substitution restrictions, we do consider some cases where vendor pairwise
substitutions are not allowed at all. However when we do allow these pairwise
substitutions, we allow an 80% pairwise substitution level. We do this with the assumption
that implementing product substitution strategy would need allowances for a higher overall
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pairwise substitution. We experiment with two bulk buy levels - 10% and 25%. The
scorecard constraints are relaxed for the results presented in this section. Table 19 shows
the changes in market shares under the two bulk buy scenarios, with joint considerations
of the various constraints. As expected, the savings with the higher bulk buy requirements
are slightly lower (9% savings with a 10% bulk buy requirement and 8% savings with 25%
bulk buy requirements). Notice the significant decrease in savings under these realistic
parameter values compared to the high savings of nearly 23% achieved by the model
without these considerations. The total count of categories in which quantity discounts are
offered are also lower with the 25% bulk buy requirement vs the 10% bulk buy
requirement. Notice that the model still allocates purchases to all four vendors allowing
enough supply diversity but dampening the magnitude of achievable savings.
Table 29: Scenarios using realistic parameters (max market share= 40%,
rebate=10%, category substitution = 20%, product substitution =35%, pairwise
substitution=80%)
Case A: bulk buy = 10%,
savings attained = 9%
Categories

Case B: bulk buy = 25%, savings
attained 8%
Vendors

Vendors

1

2

3

4

1

12%

25%

26%

37%

23%

2

17%

30%

36%

17%

36%

37%

8%

19%

37%

36%

34%

25%

27%

3
4

18%

40%

26%

16%

20%

17%

40%

23%

5

18%

20%

40%

22%

6

20%

31%

33%

16%

6

14%

34%

33%

19%

7

12%

35%

39%

14%

7

16%

40%

23%

21%

8

33%

21%

40%

6%

8

30%

24%

40%

6%

9
Count of
categories

37%

21%

28%

14%

9

37%

24%

31%

8%

9

8

2

4

9

8

1

2

1

2

3

4

1

12%

30%

23%

35%

2

16%

27%

34%

3

8%

19%

4

14%

5
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6 Discussion, Conclusions, and Managerial Implications
The primary purpose of chapters 4 and 5 has been to discuss the optimization model
formulation, data structures used, results of model testing, and experimentation in response
to research questions one through four. We discuss the research questions and the overall
conclusions in this chapter.

Q1: What is the expected cost of adhering strictly to physicians’ preferences on product?
In response to research question 1, the MILP model testing demonstrates that
physician preference decreases the magnitude of potential savings in the supply chain.
Though this is axiomatic, the results of the optimization model quantitatively capture the
effect of physician preference. Depending on the scorecard minimums and maximum
allowable market share, bulk buy requirements, and rebate levels, the expected cost of
strictly adhering to physician preference can be translated as a change in savings anywhere
from 5% to 22% (with lower savings achieved when adherence to physician preference is
highest). This certainly illustrates the potential savings to be attained if physicians were
engaged in the process of standardized product utilization and procurement.

Q2: What is the expected cost of forcing diversification among vendors as a risk mitigation
strategy?
Forcing diversification results in higher procurement costs and lower possible
savings. The loss of savings are seen as the expected cost of forcing vendor diversification.
However, maintaining diversity of supply by forcing diversification helps reduce the
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supply disruption risks associated with single sourcing. It should be noted that changes in
allowed market share for a vendor have nonlinear effects on procurement costs. With the
MILP model, tradeoffs between cost and vendor concentration can be explored in depth.
The final decision regarding the use of diversification as a risk mitigation strategy lies with
the organizations using the model. The tolerance for risk may vary by planning periods or
even over categories being negotiated. The optimization model should be used to generate
various scenarios to investigate the risk – cost tradeoffs.

Q3: What is the effect of subjective scorecards on procurement processes?
The use of subjective balanced scorecards in the determination of the procumbent
strategy emerged as an extremely important consideration for this research. We find that
using subjective scorecards as ex-ante considerations in an MILP model can present certain
risks related to fluctuating market shares and savings. Minor changes in these requirements
can cause major variations in the resulting procurement model in terms of vendor selection,
vendor market shares, and recommended purchase quantities for individual products.
We find that underlying biases in the scorecard process can result in different
scorecard structures. Especially when the rater pool is small, it may be difficult to
accurately capture the vendor’s performance. We find that the tendency of raters to give
high or low scores is likely to have a much greater effect on procurement strategies than
correlations in ratings due to common methods bias. Thus rater bias has a much more
pronounced effect in shaping the procurement strategy than the common method bias.
Seeing as these scorecards are subjective and may be influenced by the perception of
vendors or vendor- physician relationship, the scorecard and business review process must
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be carefully planned with enough checks and balances to ensure its fairness and selection
of relevant standards.

Q4: How would procurement strategies and purchasing costs change if contracts were
negotiated on an annual basis instead of a quarterly basis?
From the comparison of optimization outputs for various planning periods we notice
that there is no difference in the total quantity to be purchased, regardless of the planning
period used. We reiterate our assumption that the demand here does not consider the
seasonality of purchases (unlike actual demand which does account for seasonality).
Depending on the demand used, we demonstrate the effects of seasonal variations on the
underlying vendor market shares. The organization would need to consider these seasonal
effects when monitoring progress toward quantity discount targets. This presents an
excellent use case for a simulation model which could be employed to test alternative
purchasing strategies with consideration of stochastic effects. Using naïve methods of
deriving quarterly demand where annual demand is simply divided over the quarters and
then rounded up, may inflate the demand. In such cases there is a chance that excess
purchases may occur when quarterly demand derived from actual demand is used. If in the
future the procurement teams decide to include administrative costs associated with
contract negotiations in their analysis, it may prove beneficial to negotiate one annual
contract even with some excess inventory in the system. Especially, if a central warehouse
is already available there may be no incremental capital costs to store the buffer inventory.
There may be handling and storage costs but given the magnitude of quantity discounts,
this may be a favorable trade off.
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6.1

Conclusion and Managerial Implications for Healthcare Procurement

From an analytical modeling perspective, we examined the use of MILP models
and their sensitivity to various parameters used in the design of strategic procurement
policies. During the model testing process, we observed the sensitivity of the optimization
model solutions to small changes in cost and other important parameters that may result in
alternative optimal (or near-optimal) solutions. We caution the users that purchasing
patterns generated by a deterministic optimizing model can change greatly without
necessarily changing the total cost. Hence care must be taken to compare current costs and
market shares with suggested costs and market shares to avoid unnecessary disruptions
with suppliers. Clarifying the relevant range of parameters used helps contextualize the
results derived from the MILP models. As discussed in the previous section, with a realistic
set of parameter combinations, the savings can drop dramatically to about 8% (compared
to a fully relaxed model savings of 20%). A model like this can be used by practitioners
for planning purposes in preparation for contract negotiations. This procurement model
helps with supplier selection and trying various scorecard minima can produce different
portfolios in a matter of few minutes. We recommend that the users of this tool do the same
with other parameters such a bulk percentages, and rebates to establish a range of possible
procurement costs. In conjunction with discussions with physicians, these scenarios can
demonstrate the change in costs in response to changes in procurement parameters. This
type of analytical flexibility makes the model user friendly. We do caution the user that
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this is a deterministic model and thus issues of stochasticity of demand are deferred for
future work and extension of the model.
From the perspective of conducting applied research, we learned that as an academic
studying a supply chain problem the first step is to recognize the sources of cost, variation,
risk, and savings opportunities in the relevant business processes (This is of course true
from a managerial perspective as well). Some of these sources are specific to the business
setting. In our research physician preference was one such source of risk and cost, vendor
diversity was another. This specific knowledge can only be gained through interactions
with the practitioners themselves. Combining this business knowledge with theories and
techniques from academia helps build a usable research tool.
From a managerial/ practitioner perspective, this research provides direction on
designing procurement plans that will help minimize the overall purchase cost while
recognizing the various risks in the business processes. Effective purchasing professionals
must know what they’re buying, how it will be used, and which business process factors
affect the organization’s cost. Healthcare supply chains face a challenge of ever increasing
costs. Standard methods of generating savings opportunities with commodity products can
only yield low impact savings. To fundamentally change healthcare procurement, buy-in
is needed from physicians in determining how product utilization is designed and
standardized. It must also be acknowledged that changing market shares may have an
impact on the relationship of the hospital and vendor. Vendors who lose market share
(either due to the decisions made to ensure diversification or due to their poor performance)
may not be motivated to offer the same financial discounts for the next purchasing
initiative. This may especially pose a problem since the same vendors tend to offer products
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for different product families. It is not uncommon for larger vendors (often referred to as
“elite vendors”, “preferred suppliers” or “first tier supply partner”) to challenge the scores
being assigned to them, particularly when they are lower than expected. Justification for
the scores being assigned can be provided as long as a fair score measurement system is
implemented. Thus, implementing a dynamic procurement strategy which changes with
every periodic contract negotiation should include clear communication with vendors
about their performance and selection criteria. Supply-chain managers using this MILP
model for procurement might wish to dampen changes in market share that might occur in
pursuit of short-run cost savings – especially if alternative solutions with market shares
closer to historical or managerially preferred values for individual vendors do not differ
substantially in total cost from the MILP solution. In order to sustain vendor relationships,
managers should consider limiting sharp shifts in market share. In other words, the MILP
solution should not be implemented mechanistically. Additional constraints could be added
with limits on or penalties for changes in market share from target (historical or preferred)
values.
This dissertation brings to light these complexities and interactions of typical
considerations in healthcare procurement such as physician preference, vendor
diversification, and supplier performance. The interactions of these factors have not been
studied in academia before. We recognize that the phenomenon of physician preference for
products driven either by favorable patient outcomes, necessary specialized training, or
valued technical support from the manufacturers, has always been an implicit consideration
in healthcare procurement. However there are potential cost savings (or even improvement
in clinical outcomes (not under consideration in this research) that may be derived from
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flexibility as well. Needed was a mechanism to demonstrate to physicians the cost of their
product preferences. Though we may never be able to completely eliminate physician
preference from a healthcare supply chain, we can certainly show the range of cost savings
that may be achieved by increasing their usage flexibility. As more physicians become
involved in the administrative side of healthcare, their buy-in should become easier to
obtain.
Our results highlight some of risks in healthcare procurement, particularly the risk
of using subjective scorecards to measure vendor performance. We recommend
recognizing rater bias in scorecard processes and guarding against it. Using multiple raters
to score vendors might mute the effects of bias. Also creating scorecards that have weighted
sub metrics that constitute a higher level metric might mute the effect of rater bias. If
possible, the rating process should be conducted multiple times a year to guard against
recency bias. We do however recognize that contracts are negotiated only at certain time
intervals. Conducting a scorecard exercise just for that particular contract may not be fair
or robust enough. Scorecard processes should be implemented with two goals in mind –
improving vendor relationships throughout the year and measuring vendor performance for
a particular contract negotiation.
Finally, we acknowledge the need of healthcare procurement to diversify the supply
sources by managing vendor market shares as a means to manage risk. Though this limits
opportunities for cost savings it is important to ensure multiple viable sources of supply
are available at reasonable cost. The recent natural disasters such as the 2017 hurricane in
Puerto Rico, have shown how easily supply of essential medications can be disrupted. The
cost of overcoming such disruptions is too high and necessitates supply diversification. To
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ensure this supply diversification, it is essential to have a set of suppliers available as
partners to support the surplus need of the organization. The scorecard process should help
highlight a set of consistently high performing vendors. Their willingness to co-operate in
such situations should be captured in their performance review. Interestingly, it may be
difficult to find willing supplier partners if they have recently been rated poorly on their
performance. This highlights again how subjective scorecard processes may have a
lingering effect on business process and may in fact impede effective decision making.
In the process of this research, we have discovered that healthcare procurement is
much more complex than contract negotiations. There are behavioral factors that have to
be considered in healthcare procurement. With this research we provide guidelines for
consideration of these factors.
6.1.1

Discussion of results with healthcare organization
The results from this research were presented to the leadership team at the healthcare

organization. We received a positive response on the application and implications of this
research. The team acknowledged the importance of this research in recognizing (and
analytically modeling) the conflicting goals of maintaining physician preference, sourcing
diversity, and achieving cost savings, that healthcare procurement professionals must deal
with. The team acknowledged that the tool designed here allows them to demonstrate to
physicians various scenarios of procurement constraints and costs. They also appreciated
the results of the scorecard related research and the highlights regarding the caution that
must be exercised in using scorecards during the procurement process. The feedback
received on the implementation of this research was mainly focused on how product usage
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(and relevant purchases) may be standardized through discussions with physicians. The
team expressed considerable interest in simulation models for studying the effect of process
and demand (i.e. medical procedures) variability on quarterly or yearly procurement plans
and on the implementation of the quantity discount terms. Another area of interest that
emerged during the discussion, was the definition of product categories and the possible
application of machine learning techniques that may be utilized for the better clustering of
product categories.

6.2

Limitations
Analytically, the optimization model provides a basic deterministic solution to the

strategic procurement problem described in this chapter. Typical to optimization models,
our model is sensitive to small changes in cost and other important parameters. This
deterministic model also focuses on the procurement side of the business which means we
do not consider operational limitations such as storage space, inventory replenishment rules
etc. We assume that any bulk quantity purchased by the organization can be stocked and
consumed within the current infrastructure. Also note that this model only uses purchasing
cost in its objective function. Costs of the total system such carrying costs, administrative
costs etc. are not considered here.
From a managerial/ practitioner perspective this modeling and analysis demonstrates
to the decision maker the effects of various parameters in the business process, while giving
them the ability to adjust the various parameters to test alternative policy scenarios. It does
not account for the uncertainties or “fuzziness” associated with parameters of product cost
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or market shares. The deterministic model also does not help account for the variations
encountered in implementing the procurement plan.
In our model, we assume product demands to be independent. For a large family of
products that have a dependent demand (with a bill of materials), this model assumption
may be inappropriate. In those cases, the model should consider the differentiation of
demand in the parent product (which will have independent demand) and component
products (with their dependent demand).
We employ one possible structure of vendor and product substitutions in our model.
There are other models of product substitution (especially with dependent demands) that
may be employed depending on the pairwise substitution imposed.

6.3

Future Work
The dissertation illustrates a potential solution to make procurement processes more

holistic by incorporating non – financial considerations in an optimization model. We now
discuss the opportunities to expand upon this work for fruitful future research.
The model presented here is deterministic. From a risk-management perspective, we
acknowledge the need to consider operational issues that may be encountered when
implementing procurement plans given the normal variations that occur in the daily
running of a healthcare supply chain and in the event of significant supply-chain
disruptions. We can expect variations in procedure types, patient census, and product
usage, all of which would result in deviations from the cumulative expenditures with
vendors. This mismatch with the negotiated bulk buy amounts may prevent the hospital
from qualifying for quantity discounts. This calls for a complementary simulation model
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in which stochastic variation in medical procedures may be imposed and rules for adjusting
purchasing plans may be tested. An even more detailed operational simulation model can
be designed with consideration of appropriate reorder points, safety stock levels, and lead
times for various inventory locations in the supply chain.
There is opportunity to expand this work for multi-period applications of the MILP
model. It is not unreasonable to expect that for, multi-period models, the set of vendors
under consideration and terms for bulk-buy discounts may change over time. One might
investigate “steady-state” behavior of procurement plans under different assumptions
about how supply-chain participants may respond to the business they receive in successive
periods. Of specific interest is the type of contract terms that may emerge for future
quantity discounts after a recent period’s purchasing experience.
In this work we assume only a single quantity discount tier. Vendors may offer
multiple tiers for quantity discounts. The MILP model presented here can accommodate
such expansion by employing appropriate binary indicators for incremental discount tiers
(which would change this model to a tiered pricing model). Also, the bulk buy for quantity
discounts need not be defined as the percentage increase over current spend, as we have
implemented here. Alternative methods for achieving quantity discounts with price breaks
for a fixed quantity or a fixed dollar amount (sometimes referred to as “capped pricing”
models) may be used. This would of course lead to different market shares than the ones
suggested by the current model.
Alternative penalties in the optimization model may be used to alter the character of
of solutions. It may be possible to determine meaningful penalty magnitudes which would
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for automated resolution of conflicting constraints accoding to a hierachy of goals. This
may require different integrality tolerances or solution tactics that would increase solution
times. This is an avenue for further research.
Lastly, in this research we assumed that product usages were independent of one
another. Using statistical forecasting techniques that consider product interdependencies
and seasonality in medical procedures, we may generate projections of product use which
would alter the procurement strategies somewhat. The testing of such effects with a
combination of optimization and simulation would be an interesting refinement.
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